A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Eugenio Gomez Ruiz, of furnishing alcohol to a person under twenty-one years of age, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, ordering that the sentence be suspended after service of six months in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the crime is a strict liability crime and thereby erred in denying his requests for a jury instruction on mental states and to introduce evidence relevant to certain defenses; and (2) in sentencing him to serve six months in confinement. He also asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by charging him with a strict liability offense instead of one requiring a culpable mental state. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Raymond Mefford, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault following a bench trial in the Robertson County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to serve four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing, arguing that the trial court should have offered the elderly and homeless Defendant rehabilitative treatment in the form of housing assistance or work programs. Following our review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Doyle Wayne Mason, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the State’s closing argument, failing to adequately advise him concerning the State’s plea offer, and failing to move to exclude discovery received on the eve of trial. Petitioner further argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of Juror 2’s presence on the jury. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Joseph Sakai Hall, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of aggravated assault involving serious bodily injury, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of three to four years as a Range I offender with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service and whether to grant Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for diversion and sentenced him to four years with 180 days to serve and the remainder to be supervised on probation. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamie Scott Brock, of first degree murder in 2006, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. More than thirteen years after his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition for post- conviction relief in 2024. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition after finding it to be untimely and concluding that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal stems from a dispute over a purportedly defective sprinkler system which malfunctioned, causing significant damage to Campus Chalet, Inc. (“Campus Chalet”). East Tennessee Sprinkler Company, Inc. (“ETS”) installed the system in 1992 and remained contractually responsible for subsequent inspections, testing, and maintenance of the system. On October 5, 2023, Campus Chalet’s insurance carrier filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Washington County (the “trial court”), against ETS, alleging that the sprinkler system malfunctioned and caused significant damage to Campus Chalet. ETS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was time-barred by a statute of repose. The trial court granted ETS’s motion, and this appeal followed. Because we agree with the appellant that the negligence and breach of contract claims are based on ongoing failures to inspect, test, and maintain the system, we reverse.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) classification of the marital residence as marital property; (2) decision not to admit Tennessee Rule of Evidence 1006 summaries tendered by Husband; (3) finding of criminal contempt against Husband; (4) award of transitional alimony to Wife; and (5) award of a portion of Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs as alimony in solido. Wife asks for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s order. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is granted.

The Petitioners seek accelerated interlocutory review of an order denying their motion to recuse. However, because the Petitioners’ filings fail to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

This is an action for violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4- 21-101 to -1004 (“THRA”). The plaintiff, an associate professor at a state university, applied for promotion to the rank of full professor. While his application was under review, the plaintiff filed an age discrimination charge against the university with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). A short time later, the university denied the plaintiff’s promotion based on his alleged lack of high-quality scholarship. The trial court dismissed the action at the summary judgment stage, reasoning that the plaintiff had not produced evidence to rebut the university’s stated reason for denying his promotion. This appeal followed. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred because there was evidence that the university’s administration knowingly violated university policy by reevaluating the merits of the plaintiff’s peer-reviewed scholarship. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Appellant appeals the denial of its motion to quash a notice of lien lis pendens. Because the trial court improvidently certified its order as final under Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.