TBA's Indigent Representation Primer series recently featured two articles that provide basics about Tennessee's system for appointed counsel as well as context for discussions about increased resources for indigent representation. The initial primer article introduces the basics of our state's system and the situations that require counsel be appointed for individuals unable to afford representation. The second primer article highlights background and data about Tennessee's Indigent Representation Program, including how courts determine and assign counsel for indigent defendants and vulnerable individuals. Both items include information about the General Assembly's 2024 increased funding for indigent representation — a step in the right direction, but still leaving a significant gap to fill.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arises from a criminal investigation of Plaintiffs for a fire that occurred at their restaurant in Westland, Michigan. In Case No. 19-1882, Defendants John Adams and Michael Reddy Jr. appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim on qualified immunity grounds. In Case No. 19-1870, Defendant Michael Reddy Sr. appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. And in Case No. 19-1857, Defendant Richard Sanchez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim on qualified immunity grounds. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Reddy Sr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the district court’s order with respect to the other Defendants.

The Defendant, Yancey Lee Williams II, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) the trial court erred by finding that he was engaged in unlawful activity and thereby omitting the “no duty to retreat” language from the self-defense instruction; (3) the prosecutor made improper and inflammatory comments regarding religion and race during closing arguments; and (4) plain error occurred when the State failed to provide pretrial documentation of a witness’s statement to law enforcement despite an order being in place directing such disclosure. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Tennessee, is there ever a time when a prosecutor would not be allowed to dismiss a case after indictment? Politics aside, the controversy over the United States Department of Justice’s motion to dismiss the case against Michael Flynn presents important issues regarding the scope of authority between prosecutors and courts.

A homeowner brought suit against the owner of the house next door, asserting a claim for breach of a joint driveway agreement and an alternative action for a declaratory judgment that the neighbor had abandoned the easement created by the driveway agreement. The neighbor filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, trespass, and an alternative claim for rescission for failure of consideration. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order determining the boundaries of the easement established by the driveway agreement; the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the easement and abandonment as well as the defendant’s claim for trespass. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the boundaries of the easement, its denial of her claims for breach of the easement and abandonment, and in its award of discretionary costs to the defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination action, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to his minor child based upon two statutory grounds, finding that those grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this termination action, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to his minor child based upon two statutory grounds, finding that those grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A federal lawsuit challenging Tennessee's new congressional map was voluntarily dismissed Tuesday after plaintiffs failed to obtain a temporary injunction in May, the Daily Memphian reports. The suit was filed by a coalition of Democratic voters and congressional candidates, including state Rep. Justin J. Pearson, D-Memphis, and Democratic U.S. Rep. Steve Cohen, who argued the map was enacted too close to the August primary elections to be properly implemented. The case was dismissed at the request of the plaintiffs. Separate lawsuits brought by the ACLU of Tennessee and the NAACP State Conference of Tennessee, which challenge the map on the grounds that it violates the 14th and 15th Amendments by diluting Black voting strength, remain pending.

A homeowner brought suit against the owner of the house next door, asserting a claim for breach of a joint driveway agreement and an alternative action for a declaratory judgment that the neighbor had abandoned the easement created by the driveway agreement. The neighbor filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, trespass, and an alternative claim for rescission for failure of consideration. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order determining the boundaries of the easement established by the driveway agreement; the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the easement and abandonment as well as the defendant’s claim for trespass. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the boundaries of the easement, its denial of her claims for breach of the easement and abandonment, and in its award of discretionary costs to the defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.