JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. The Fair Housing Center of Metropolitan Detroit (the Center) brought claims against defendants under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The district court concluded that the Center had standing to bring suit but granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. The Center timely appealed. For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for further discovery and argument on the issue of standing.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. As Congress has said, the Internet has “flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4). The Federal Communications Commission largely followed this command from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by regulating the Internet with a light touch for nearly 15 years after enactment. But since, the FCC’s approach has been anything but consistent.

Beginning in the late 2000s, the FCC undertook several attempts to impose so-called “net neutrality policies,” which prohibit Broadband Internet Service Providers from controlling users’ Internet access—by varying speeds or blocking connections to third-party websites, for example—based on content, commercial agreements, and other reasons a provider might want to manage a user’s Internet experience. Those efforts culminated in 2015, when the FCC concluded for the first time that Broadband Internet Service Providers offer to consumers a “telecommunications service” and thus are common carriers—and subject to extensive regulation (including net-neutrality restrictions)—under Title II of the Communications Act. Id. § 153(51).

Corresponding with a change in administrations, in 2018, the FCC rescinded its 2015 determination and instead reverted to its historical hands-off approach to Internet regulation by concluding that Broadband Internet Service Providers offered only “information service.” Id. § 153(24). That change lifted the net-neutrality requirements.

The D.C. Circuit heard substantial challenges to the 2015 and 2018 orders. It applied the now-overruled Chevron doctrine in each case and upheld both wholly inconsistent regulations as “permissible” under the Act.

Today we consider the latest FCC order, issued in 2024, which resurrected the FCC’s heavy-handed regulatory regime. Under the present Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet Order, Broadband Internet Service Providers are again deemed to offer a “telecommunications service” under Title II and therefore must abide by net-neutrality principles. 89 Fed. Reg. 45404 (May 22, 2024) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20) [hereinafter Safeguarding Order]. But unlike past challenges that the D.C. Circuit considered under Chevron, we no longer afford deference to the FCC’s reading of the statute. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024) (overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Instead, our task is to determine “the best reading of the statute” in the first instance. Id.

Using “the traditional tools of statutory construction,” id., we hold that Broadband Internet Service Providers offer only an “information service” under 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), and therefore, the FCC lacks the statutory authority to impose its desired net-neutrality policies through the “telecommunications service” provision of the Communications Act, id. § 153(51). Nor does the Act permit the FCC to classify mobile broadband—a subset of broadband Internet services—as a “commercial mobile service” under Title III of the Act (and then similarly impose net-neutrality restrictions on those services). Id. § 332(c)(1)(A). We therefore grant the petitions for review and set aside the FCC’s Safeguarding Order.

In two cases, one in which she is the subject of an order of protection and another in which she was held in criminal contempt, Agnes McCury filed what appear ot be identical motions to recuse the trial judge. nI her motions, Ms. McCury claimed the trial judge who presided over both cases was "unable to be impartial." She alleged that she had a "contentious history" with the judge "regarding his Oath of Office" and because of a federal lawsuit that she filed against him. She faulted the judge for his "attitude towards her VAWA (Violence Against Women Act) status." She complained that the judge "violated Rule 10B on multiple occasions and refused ot disqualify himself when required to by Rule 2.11 of [the Code of] Judicial Conduct." She further complained that the judge "violated his administrative duties to dispose of [her] motions timely and schedule hearings for these motions sent to him by the Clerk." She also complained that the judge violated her "Due Process and Equal Protection rights to 'give evidence' at crucial proceedings in her civil and criminal cases to support the petition to terminate her parental rights."

Plaintiff was injured after attempting to cross a street outside of a crosswalk and being struck by a city-owned vehicle driven by a city employee. The trial court found that the city was vicariously liable for the employee-driver’s negligence and directly liable for its negligent hiring and retaining of the employee-driver. The trial court ultimately found the plaintiff 10% at fault for her injuries. The city appealed, and this Court reversed, finding that there was no proof of negligent hiring and that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s allocation of fault. Instead, this Court concluded that the plaintiff was at least 50% at fault, barring recovery. The Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the judgment as failing to afford the trial court’s findings of fact appropriate deference, but acknowledged the plaintiff’s failure to appeal the conclusion that the negligent hiring finding was unsupported. On remand, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for the re-allocation of fault and calculation of damages.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee has welcomed Michael J. Dumitru as its newest magistrate judge. Dumitru took the oath of office during a private ceremony in the Joel W. Solomon U.S. Courthouse. A public investiture will take place in the coming months, according to a news release from the court. Dumitru succeeds Susan K. Lee, who is retiring after serving the court since 2004. Dumitru previously worked as a Hamilton County circuit court judge and a litigator in private practice. He earned his law degree from Vanderbilt University Law School in 2011. See a photo from the event.

The Tennessee Department of Revenue will host a free webinar on Jan. 8 about state tax obligations for new businesses in Tennessee. The session also will highlight resources that may help new businesses. The webinar is one in a series of educational sessions held by the department each month. Register for the webinar or read more in a press release from the department.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has reinstated Florida lawyer Robert John Grubb II to the practice of law in Tennessee. He had been placed on inactive status more than five years ago, on May 1, 2015. Grubb filed a petition for reinstatement and the Board of Professional Responsibility found it to be satisfactory. The court made the reinstatement retroactive to Dec. 27, 2024.

The Tennessee Worker’s Comp Appeals Board has announced it will hold winter oral arguments in four appeals on Jan. 21. Two cases, White v. Federal Express Corp. and Markin v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, will be argued in person beginning at 9 a.m. CST in the Supreme Court Building, 402 S. Shannon St., Jackson 38301. Virtual arguments in two other cases, Torres v. Allvan Corp. and Pritchard v. GSP Transportation, will follow at 11:30 a.m. and 12:40 p.m., respectively. Read more about the cases.

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts has released his year-end report, using the document to reiterate concerns about judges’ safety and condemn elected officials who intimidate judges or defy court rulings. The Hill reports that Roberts did not name any specific people, but noted one decision that prompted calls for impeachment. “Attempts to intimidate judges for their rulings in cases are inappropriate and should be vigorously opposed,” Roberts wrote. “Public officials certainly have a right to criticize the work of the judiciary, but they should be mindful that intemperance in their statements when it comes to judges may prompt dangerous reactions by others.” Roberts also used the report to reiterate concerns about violence against judges, highlighting how threats increasingly are being made online and in the form of “doxxing.”

A three-judge panel of the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) did not have legal authority to reinstate so-called “net neutrality” rules, which had been in place during the Barack Obama presidency but repealed in 2017 during the first Donald Trump administration. Generally, net-neutrality rules require internet service providers to treat internet data and users equally rather than restricting access, slowing speeds or blocking content for certain users. The rules also forbid special arrangements in which providers give improved network speeds or access to favored users. The Biden administration had made restoring the rules a priority, Reuters reports. The panel cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in a Loper Bright, which overturned a precedent giving deference to government agencies in interpreting laws they administer. Read the opinion.