CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal does not lack for challenging features. The factual backdrop is the complex market for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in the United States. And the chief legal doctrine at play, the so-called dormant or negative Commerce Clause, has been unflatteringly described as a “quagmire,” Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959), “hopelessly confused,” Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and “inherently unpredictable,” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

But in practice, today’s case turns on some relatively basic questions. Can the State of Michigan require someone selling a product in Michigan to procure that product from the state? Or, phrased in the language of the coin’s other side, can Michigan bar in-state retailers from obtaining their merchandise from outside the state? On these issues, negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence is straightforward. Whether the product at issue is milk, see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 352 (1951), or coal-based electricity, see Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440 (1992), the Commerce Clause prohibits such state restrictions unless they clear strict scrutiny’s high bar, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). At issue here are Michigan electricity market regulations that expressly restrict where Michigan’s electricity retailers may procure their capacity. Accordingly, that regulatory regime must be evaluated through the lens of strict scrutiny. To allow the district court to engage in that analysis with the benefit of our views here, we reverse and remand.

James Lee Simmons, Jr., Defendant, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of the registration law, and resisting arrest. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the manner of service of Defendant’s nine-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered the sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Elijah Ogburn, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction, forty years for each attempted murder conviction, and ten years for each employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively to one another for an effective sentence of life plus 100 years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court’s sentence was excessive; (3) the trial court erred by not granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by issuing a material witness bond for Devion Lisenby. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Richard P. Nielsen, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his "Motion to Amend" his sentence, alleging that the trial court inappropriately construed the motion as a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and improperly denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants, Ashley Ledford and Brandon Stepp, were convicted by a Campbell County jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse and neglect of a child under the age of eight resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court imposed effective twenty-one-year sentences for each Defendant. On appeal, Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements and by consolidating Defendants’ cases, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendants. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jamie P. Dennis, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for attempted rape of a child and attempted incest. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Petitioner’s trial counsel and appellate counsel provided him with effective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner bases his ineffectiveness claims on trial counsel’s failure to present a specific defense related to criminal attempt as a lesser included offense, failure to request reclassification of his prior conviction offenses to establish the appropriate sentencing range, and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the same issues on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A husband never answered his wife’s complaint for divorce, and the trial court entered a default against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and divided the marital estate. Within thirty days of entry of the final decree, the husband moved for relief from the judgment. On appeal, the husband faults the court for denying his motion. We affirm.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a lawsuit against Fayette County, alleging that the Board of County Commissioners violated the Voting Rights Act when it adopted its 2021 redistricting plan. According to a news release from the agency, the new plan allegedly denied the city’s Black voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The suit, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, argues that commissioners “deliberately rejected multiple districting plans that would have combined Black communities in districts that would allow Black voters to elect representatives of their choice.” According to Tennessee Lookout, Fayette County Mayor Rhea “Skip” Taylor confirmed the county is reviewing the lawsuit, but declined further comment.

The Tennessee Supreme Court censured Michigan attorney Alexander Robert Starr on Jan. 14. The court reports that Starr was authorized to practice in Tennessee while his application for comity admission was pending. Starr did not file motions for pro hac vice admission in at least six criminal cases in Henderson County over the course of five months as required under Rule 7. The court found that these actions violated Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court has transferred the law license of Shelby County lawyer Michael Joseph Parks to disability inactive status. Parks may not practice law while on inactive status but may petition for reinstatement by showing that his disability has been removed.