So much is being written about how the intersection of technology and the legal sector has sparked a revolution in delivery of legal services, including in the access to justice community. A number of pro bono projects in Tennessee are intentionally and strategically utilizing new technology, platforms and approaches. These technological advancements and AI-powered tools are changing the landscape, enabling legal service organizations to help meet client needs more effectively and efficiency. The essays that comprise this issue's cover story explore the crucial role that AI and other technological innovations play in supporting legal aid initiatives, pro bono work and broader access to justice projects. These innovations have the potential to create a more inclusive and responsive legal systems for all.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Percy Brown appeals the dismissal of his malicious-prosecution claim against Defendant-Appellee Jeffrey Jewell as barred by the statute of limitations. We AFFIRM.

The Petitioner, Darrnell Treshawn Wiggins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2019 convictions for second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and kidnapping. The Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to challenge on direct appeal the admission of body camera footage showing the victim’s dying declaration. The State asserts that (1) the Petitioner has waived his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by not properly presenting the issue before the post-conviction court, and (2) waiver notwithstanding, the Petitioner failed to establish appellate counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Billy Gene Sliger, appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Specifically, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction; (2) the trial court erred by interrupting jury deliberations to inform the jury of the court’s schedule; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire, opening statement, and closing arguments; (4) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect an offense for count two charging rape of a child and instead giving a modified unanimity instruction; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kerrington J’Kobe Lake, entered guilty pleas to two felonies, felony evading arrest and attempted tampering with evidence; and three misdemeanors, speeding, reckless driving, and simple possession of marijuana, with the trial court to determine whether to grant judicial diversion or, alternatively, the length and manner of his sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of three years, with the Defendant to serve 180 days in jail before serving the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court (1) unreasonably denied judicial diversion, and (2) imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Melvin Lee Harth, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated assault involving strangulation, a Class C felony; two counts of aggravated assault involving the violation of a prior court order, a Class C felony; false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (Supp. 2024) (aggravated assault); 39-13-302 (2018) (false imprisonment), 39-16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective nine-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Terrell McKissack, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a codefendant’s recanted testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence. Based on our review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Shane Scott Caywood, pleaded guilty to the sale or delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class E felony, and several misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III Persistent Offender for the Class B felony and as a Range III Career Offender for the Class E felony and ordered concurrent sentences for an effective total of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for community corrections. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Tracy D. Boyd, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of three counts of impersonating a licensed professional, two counts of theft of property, and one count of forgery. He claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this condemnation action, the trial court entered an order of possession granting to the petitioner city two greenway easements and two construction easements over two tracts of land owned by the respondent corporation. In the order of possession, the court found that the city’s taking was for the public purpose of the city’s greenway project. The corporation filed two successive motions for summary judgment, claiming that because the taking was partially for a private purpose, it violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. The corporation averred that the order of possession required the city to construct parking spaces on one of the corporation’s tracts to replace parking spaces taken from the other tract and that this would yield only a private benefit. The corporation also asserted that the city had abandoned its taking by failing to construct the replacement parking despite the completion of the greenway. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment, determining that the order of possession had not required the city to build replacement parking and that no abandonment had occurred. Following a jury trial regarding compensation, the trial court entered a judgment approving the jury’s monetary award to the corporation with prejudgment interest. The corporation has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the corporation’s request for an award of costs and attorney’s fees on appeal.