The Memphis suburb of Germantown and a city resident have reached a settlement in a federal lawsuit over the use of giant skeleton decorations in holiday displays. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), which represented resident Alexis Luttrell, and the city agreed to a $24,999 settlement in exchange for the dismissal of Luttrell’s First Amendment lawsuit, according to a news release. FIRE told The Commercial Appeal the settlement came shortly after the Germantown Board of Mayor and Aldermen unanimously approved the final reading to repeal the city’s holiday decoration ordinance during its April 28 meeting. The board did not discuss a new ordinance. In March, Germantown voluntarily dismissed charges against Luttrell for keeping skeletons in her yard beyond the 30-day limit set by the city’s property maintenance code, less than a month after FIRE filed the lawsuit.

Nashville School of Law (NSL) Dean William C. Koch Jr. announced Nashville attorney Marlene Eskind Moses as a new member of the NSL Board of Trust. Moses is a partner in the family law section at Gullett Sanford Robinson & Martin (GSRM Law) where she specializes in family law litigation, mediation, arbitration and collaborative law. Moses has been a staunch advocate of NSL since she graduated in 1980. “I am thrilled to be a board member at the Nashville School of Law," Moses said. "I owe the school a lot in terms of how it has propelled my life both professionally and personally." Koch stated, "Marlene’s national and international leadership in the field of family law demonstrates that NSL’s law degree enables our graduates to reach the heights of our noble profession.” Moses is a regular columnist for the Tennessee Bar Journal, coauthoring the Family Matters column with her associate, Ansley Owens Tillett. Read a press release from the law school.

BUSH, Circuit Judge. More than six years after his indictment, Defendant-Appellee Eric Schuster moved to dismiss three felony child pornography charges pending against him. He argued the federal government’s failure to bring him to trial violated the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. Finding that Schuster caused most of the delay, the district court denied his motion. But upon reconsideration, the district court reversed course and dismissed his indictment with prejudice.This is a difficult case, and the record before us should trouble any jurist. Because we respectfully disagree with how the district court applied the factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), however, we REVERSE. Specifically, though some of the delay in Schuster’s trial is attributable to the dilatory action of the district court, Schuster is more to blame for the overall delay. Perhaps most importantly, Schuster failed to sincerely assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner—Schuster’s litigation conduct as a whole indicates that he did not want a speedy trial. And his failure to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delay slams the door shut. Though finding ways to move this case forward more quickly would have been greatly preferable to the actual pace of the proceedings, Schuster was not denied his right to a speedy trial. His prosecution may go forward.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff C.S., by her father and next friend, Adam Stroub, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants Craig McCrumb, Amy Leffel, and Michael Papanek in this First Amendment action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The Petitioner, Joseph George Schenck, appeals the trial court’s summary denial and dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence is illegal because he did not sign the circuit court judgment forms and it was neither explained to him nor announced on the record that he was required to serve 75% of his sentence before he was eligible for work release, furlough, trusty status, or rehabilitative programs. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert L. Hall, Jr., of one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, and one count of criminal trespass. The trial court ordered an effective thirty-two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for felony possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. John W. and Kelli W. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Crystal B. (“Mother”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter, Sawyer B. (“the Child”). The juvenile court previously found that Mother committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the Child’s half-sibling from abuse by John B., a man Mother lived with. Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s finding. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she left John B. as soon as she could, although she remained with him for months after the termination petition was filed and continued to contact him. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action brought by the appellee against the appellant based upon the appellant’s purported breach of a duty to collect and remit to the appellee annual dues owed to it by the appellant’s members. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a petition for criminal contempt filed by the petitioner, Nikki Sixx, against the respondent, Vanessa Clark, concerning Ms. Clark’s alleged violations of multiple orders of protection. The trial court found Ms. Clark guilty of 100 counts of contempt, sentencing her to 300 days in jail and imposing $5,000 in fines. Ms. Clark has appealed. As a threshold matter, we determine that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. Clark’s challenges to the validity and scope of the underlying orders of protection from which no appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that Ms. Clark has waived any challenges to her bond conditions by failing to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Regarding the trial court’s contempt findings, upon our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment in part, vacating the contempt finding regarding count 7 and subtracting count 43, which was found not to constitute a violation of the order of protection, from the trial court’s total. We also reduce Ms. Clark’s sentence by one day, awarding her the appropriate pretrial jail credit. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reflect a total of 98 counts of contempt. These modifications also require that the judgment reflect total fines of $4,900 and a sentence of 293 days. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises from a dispute between two municipalities and the district attorney general responsible for prosecuting cases in the jurisdiction in which the municipalities lie. The district attorney general threatened to cease the prosecution of cases in the courts of the municipalities and stated that he would only continue to do so if the municipalities provided an additional assistant attorney general position for his office or funding for such a position. The district attorney general justifies his threat by citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1), which he asserts requires municipalities to fund additional prosecutorial personnel in order for his duty to prosecute cases in municipal court to be triggered. The municipalities filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and later amended their claims to include a request for declaratory judgment. The trial court ordered that the municipalities were entitled to a declaratory judgment “that they ha[d] provided ‘sufficient personnel’” to the district attorney general and that he could not avoid the responsibility of prosecuting cases “by invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(6).” The trial court also determined that the district attorney general had a “clear statutory mandate” and issued a “peremptory writ of mandamus” compelling the district attorney general to comply with the statute. The district attorney general appeals. Finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1)’s “personnel requirement” does not refer to prosecutorial personnel, we affirm in part and reverse in part.