KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Some 27 years ago, in a suit that Georgia-Pacific itself brought, the district court declared Georgia-Pacific liable for cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in southwest Michigan. As a result of that declaration—under our precedents and a decision of the Supreme Court—Georgia-Pacific could, from that point forward, seek to recover those costs only by means of a contribution action under § 113(f) of the statute known as CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)). In Georgia-Pacific’s last appeal in this case, we held that its claims under § 113(f) were time-barred. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. NCR Corp., 32 F.4th 534 (6th Cir. 2022). Yet on remand, for reasons that admittedly made good practical sense, the district court re-entered a declaratory judgment that it had awarded to Georgia-Pacific under a different provision of CERCLA, namely § 107. International Paper Company and Weyerhaeuser Company now argue that the court’s re-entry of its declaratory judgment was contrary to law. We agree and vacate the court’s judgment to that extent.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. The district court below issued a preliminary injunction barring certain Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes. After an intervening Sixth Circuit decision called that relief into question, the Tennessee officials asked the district court to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction. But the district court refused. Instead, it ordered the case administratively closed and dismissed the officials’ motion without prejudice. Because that’s an appealable order, and because the district court abused its discretion in refusing to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction, we reverse.

RITZ, Circuit Judge. Donald Freed, Gratiot County, and the state of Michigan appeal the district court’s order awarding Freed attorneys’ fees. We affirm the court’s determination that Gratiot County and Michigan are liable for attorneys’ fees. But for the following reasons, we vacate the court’s fee calculation and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Markhayle Jackson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his agreed-upon sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an illegal, indeterminate sentence for his conviction of first degree murder. He also contends that he should be permitted the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) by failing to ensure his guilty plea was both voluntary and intelligent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Elijah Garrison, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue to the jury that an eyewitness’s testimony was unreliable because the eyewitness’s initial statements to police were “essentially coerced” and (2) failing to present and argue to the jury additional evidence that, in his view, contradicted the State’s proof. After review, we affirm.

David Fletcher, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated burglary, first degree murder, and felony murder for his role in a gang-related shooting. He was sentenced to life plus ten years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Fletcher, No M2018-01293-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 995795, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner filed an untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, Petitioner complains that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner a continuance. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant, Forrest Durham, pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated statutory rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an agreed-upon six-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion and by requiring him to register as a sex offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent guilty of forty- one counts of criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection issued on February 23, 2024. The respondent timely appealed from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. However, due to significant deficiencies in the respondent’s appellate brief, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Appellant, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving two life sentences, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Chancery Court, alleging that he was not given proper credit for time served. Appellant specifically sought credit for the time he was confined in Texas while fighting his extradition to Tennessee. In his complaint, Appellant requested that the trial court compel the Defendants to enforce the judgments to give him credit for time served and further requested that the Defendants be found in contempt for failure to do so. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, finding that the criminal court that entered the judgments previously denied Appellant’s request for pretrial jail credits. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss the appeal.

In this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of several of the employee’s motions, the employee alleges various injuries due to an incident at work. Prior to the issuance of a dispute certification notice, the employee filed a motion to compel the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical benefits, and mileage reimbursement. The employer objected, arguing that the employee’s motion was premature and that the employee’s requests for benefits would be more properly heard at an expedited hearing. After a mediator issued a dispute certification notice, the employee renewed his motion and requested an expedited hearing. After a subsequent status hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the employee’s motions as premature, stating it was appropriate to hear the requests at an expedited hearing, which it set. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order, find the appeal frivolous, and remand the case.