Question: Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102(d) requires that each year the compensation for certain county officials “be increased by a dollar amount equal to the average annualized general increase in state employees’ compensation . . . during the prior fiscal year multiplied by the compensation established herein for the county officials of the county with the median population of all counties; provided, however, that the annualized general increase tied to the increase in state employees’ compensation shall not exceed five percent (5%) in any given year[.]” For the past several years, the County Technical Assistance Service has published a schedule indicating the minimum salary based on the foregoing statutory provision for various county officials, including allowing for a yearly increase of up to 5% for elections administrators. However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-12-208(f) requires that “each July 1 . . . the compensation for certified administrators . . . shall be increased by a dollar amount equal to the average annualized general increase in state employee’s compensation during the prior fiscal year multiplied by the compensation established for the county officials of the county with the median population of all counties; provided, in no year shall such compensation increase by more than ten percent (10%).” In years in which the average annualized general increase in state employee compensation is 10% or greater, is the minimum increase in compensation for certified elections administrators 5% or 10%?

Opinion: The formula and 10% cap in Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-12-208(f) govern compensation increases for certified elections administrators.

Question: The Environmental Protection Agency regulates public water systems through the federal Safe Drinking Water Act which focuses on ensuring public water systems meet standards for contaminants and implement treatment techniques to achieve this goal. Without creating a conflict with federal standards, can Tennessee amend its state Safe Drinking Water Act to provide that a point-of-entry water softening system at a large multifamily housing facility or apartment complex is not a “treatment facility”?

Opinion: Probably. No judicial decision or agency guidance cleanly resolves this issue. But the best reading of the relevant statutory and regulatory authority suggests such legislation would be permissible, and there is broad support among States that softening does not trigger regulation as a consecutive water system. Some States with primacy authority have already adopted regulations that offer a pathway for building owners to use softening systems without incurring the normal regulatory burdens associated with public water systems.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. An immigration judge issued a final order holding that Arsen Sarkisov, an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, is subject to deportation. Over six years later, Sarkisov moved to reopen his case, but the immigration judge denied that motion. Sarkisov appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which rejected his claim. In 2023, Sarkisov appealed the Board’s decision to our court. At the same time, he asked our court to stay the immigration judge’s deportation order for the duration of the appeal. The United States did not oppose this request for a stay. The case was then paused for almost a year while Sarkisov sought to negotiate a resolution with the government. But the litigation resumed when those efforts failed. Sarkisov’s motion for a stay is now before us. The traditional test for a stay governs an alien’s request for a stay of removal pending appeal. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). The alien requesting a stay “bears the burden of showing” that the court should exercise its discretion to award this extraordinary form of equitable relief. Id. at 433–34. To satisfy that burden, the applicant must show, among other factors, (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his underlying appeal and (2) that he will be irreparably injured without a stay. Id. at 434. But these two factors “are the most critical.” Id. Only “[o]nce an applicant satisfies the first two factors” does the court assess (3) the harm to the opposing party and (4) weigh the public interest. Id. at 434–35. These last two factors merge into a single inquiry when the government is the opposing party. Id. at 435. Here, Sarkisov hasn’t met his burden. His two-page motion doesn’t show that he is entitled to a stay under Nken. Start with the first factor, likelihood of success on the merits. Far from persuading us that he is likely to succeed, Sarkisov’s stay motion doesn’t say anything at all about the merits. So he can’t establish this factor. Second, Sarkisov hasn’t offered a single reason why he would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. He offers only the conclusory assertion that “I will suffer irreparable harm if I am removed.” ECF No. 3 at Pg. 1. But removal from the United States “is not categorically irreparable.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. When Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, it repealed a prior statute that prevented aliens who leave the United States from continuing to seek review of their removal orders. Id. Since litigants like Sarkisov are now free to continue pursuing their appeals from abroad if they are deported while the appeal is pending, “the burden of removal alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable injury.” Id. Thus, without any additional arguments showing why his removal during appeal would cause him irreparable harm, Sarkisov can’t satisfy this factor. Sarkisov’s failure to satisfy these two “most critical” stay factors—likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm—dooms his motion. Id. at 434; see also D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining in the analogous context of a preliminary injunction that irreparable injury is always required before a court may award preliminary equitable relief). In any event, Sarkisov has also failed to establish that his removal pending appeal would harm the public interest. “There is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 436. “The continued presence” in the United States of an alien lawfully determined to be removable “permits and prolongs a continuing violation of United States law.” Id. (cleaned up). Sarkisov hasn’t argued that his case is different. To be sure, the government has not opposed Sarkisov’s motion for a stay. But that doesn’t mean that Sarkisov is entitled to relief. First, the government’s non-opposition can’t relieve Sarkisov of his burden to satisfy the Nken test. Here, neither party has made any arguments about likelihood of success, irreparable harm, or the public interest. And because Sarkisov is the party who “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify” an exercise of our equitable discretion, we must hold against him his failure to make that showing. See id. at 433–34. What’s more, the government may not effectively compel a court to enter equitable relief by failing to oppose a motion that seeks such relief. A stay pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy that lies within the discretion of the court. Equitable remedies such as stays are “never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Thus, a court must decide for itself whether this remedy is warranted, even though the government does not oppose its issuance. Accordingly, the motion for a stay of removal is DENIED.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Daniel Lockridge, who stands convicted of a methamphetamine- distribution charge, challenges two conditions of his supervised release, one requiring him to obtain mental-health treatment, the other requiring him to obtain substance-abuse treatment. No. 24-5784 United States v. Lockridge Page 2 He claims that both conditions flout the district court’s responsibilities under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because a probation officer oversees them. Seeing no constitutional infirmities, we affirm.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant law enforcement officers of Kent County, Michigan, appeal the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment in connection with this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for the alleged wrongful death of Michael Molson. Plaintiff Kim Hodges, the administrator of Molson’s estate, alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Molson’s serious medical needs, resulting in his death. For these public officials to be granted qualified immunity from liability, they must not have violated the decedent’s clearly established constitutional rights. Because this standard is satisfied, and for the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity pursuant to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and REMAND for entry of judgment for Defendants.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Elfido Gonzalez Castillo illegally entered the United States and eventually applied for citizenship. He succeeded, but only because he failed to disclose a recent indictment for sexually abusing his niece. Shortly after becoming a citizen, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to the offense. Years later, the government revoked Gonzalez’s citizenship due to his lie. It then tried to deport him based on a statute that renders removable “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of . . . child abuse.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). An immigration judge ordered him removed, as did the Board of Immigration Appeals. But because Gonzalez was a citizen, not an alien, when his conviction occurred, and because the Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument, we grant his petition for review.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Nashville office of Thompson Burton has signed a lease to expand its Midtown office space by approximately 16,000 square feet, adding a full floor to its footprint at 1801 West End Ave., the Nashville Business Journal reports. Founded in 2012 by Walt Burton and Kevin Thompson, the firm has has offices in Franklin, Huntsville, Alabama, and Washington, D.C. The Nashville office opened in 2019 with about 5,000 square feet and now occupies more than six times that amount. “We're bursting at the seams right now. This will add space for hopefully another 25 lawyers,” Burton told the Business Journal. “This will give us runway to grow for the next few years, which we really haven't had in a while because physical space has been a confinement of that.”

Shelby County Mayor Lee Harris was scheduled to sign an executive order today limiting solitary confinement within the Shelby County Division of Corrections during a ceremony at the County Corrections Center. Harris’ order reportedly would cap solitary confinement at 15 days and require that individuals held in isolation be allowed out of their cells for at least two hours per day, The Daily Memphian reports. Harris plans to follow the executive order with a proposed ordinance, which he will present to the Shelby County Board of Commissioners to codify the policy change. The new limits are part of a broader reform package that includes a point system for infractions, incentives for good behavior, rehabilitation programs, and a contract system in which inmates agree to work toward better outcomes.

President Donald Trump will sign executive order this week again extending the deadline for TikTok’s parent company to divest from the video-sharing app. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt announced the news Tuesday, according to The Hill. The expected order would mark the third extension since Trump took office in January. “This extension will last 90 days, which the administration will spend working to ensure this deal is closed so that the American people can continue to use TikTok with the assurance that their data is safe and secure,” Leavitt said. Her confirmation of the news came just hours after Trump said he likely would extend the deadline to prevent a ban on TikTok from taking effect in the United States.