Save the date for TBA’s 2025 Environmental Law Forum, set for Dec. 5 in Nashville. The program will run from 10 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. CST and will include lunch. This staple for Tennessee lawyers and environmental professionals will feature timely topics relevant to the practice area. Environmental Law Section members save on registration costs. Not a section member? Get started here. Stay tuned for more details about speakers and topics coming soon.

Lawyers for Kilmar Abrego Garcia and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Middle Tennessee have agreed that Abrego Garcia can be released from custody tomorrow, the Nashville Banner reports. A flurry of filings on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week asked District Court Judge Waverly Crenshaw to release him on Friday. Crenshaw had issued a stay of his release order until Friday due to uncertainty about whether Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would attempt to detain and deport him again. But after a federal judge in Maryland barred ICE from using a detainer warrant to grab him upon release, both sides agreed to the release. Abrego Garcia’s attorneys also have asked Crenshaw to order ICE to allow him to have access to legal counsel in the event he is detained. The defendant is facing human smuggling charges in Nashville stemming from a 2022 traffic stop.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his young daughter. The trial court found that the ground of failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Riccy Enriquez-Perdomo entered the United States illegally as a child. She was initially ordered to be deported, but later benefited from Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), which makes her order of removal non-enforceable. Prior to the immediate events, which gave rise to this lawsuit, Enriquez-Perdomo was a well-known visitor at a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) facility in Louisville, Kentucky where she frequently went to post bond for those held in custody. One day when Enriquez-Perdomo visited the ICE office in Louisville, she was suddenly detained by several ICE agents without a warrant or probable cause, despite her DACA status. Enriquez-Perdomo was then repeatedly moved to different locations across the country until she was finally released eight days later. After her release, Enriquez-Perdomo sued the ICE agents who detained her, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, relying on the Supreme Court case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics to establish an implied federal cause of action. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). After a previous appeal, her First Amendment claims were dismissed. Upon remand, the district court then granted summary judgment to defendants, reasoning that all Enriquez-Perdomo’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were invalid extensions of Bivens. Enriquez-Perdomo appealed. We now affirm the decision of the district court.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Sometimes family members don’t make the best business partners. And sometimes closely held corporations don’t observe corporate formalities. Combine them and you’ll likely get a mess—which is what this case is.

We find that because the share transfer was not a resignation, and because Tarter Industries never took a formal act to reconstitute the board, the third generation was the board and its officers at the time of the special meeting. As a result, the meeting was validly called, the board had a quorum, and a majority of the directors voted to allow Tarter Industries to sue. As a result, the direct suit by Tarter Industries can proceed.

The Defendant, Jason A. McCain, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender because the State did not file its notice of intent to seek enhancement punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) until the day of his sentencing hearing and that his six-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Appellant, Quadarius Deshun Martin, pled guilty to seven offenses on April 4, 2024, and received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. Eighteen days later, the Appellant filed an unsigned, untitled, handwritten pleading in which he stated he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that he pled guilty under duress and that trial counsel failed to investigate his case. The trial court1 entered an order construing the filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointing counsel. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated that it would hear both the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas and his petition for post-conviction relief. Following the hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief but did not rule upon the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Appellant appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to find he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether the trial court erred by construing the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction relief despite his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for consideration of the Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Defendant, Joseph Raymond Cacciatore, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which Defendant sought a reduction of his effective ten-year sentence of incarceration resulting from his guilty pleas to two counts of solicitation of a minor, three counts of coercion of a witness, and one count of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Defendant contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that he was arrested and confined without being properly indicted. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leonard Harrison Beard, Jr., was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment involving a habitation, a Class C felony; vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment); 39-17-1307 (2018) (felon in possession of a firearm); 39-14-408 (Supp. 2024) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading); 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed an effective fifty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a doctor as time barred and for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.