The Hamilton County Attorney’s Office on Thursday announced the launch of a new online system for submitting public records requests. The system is designed to provide the public and members of the media with a more transparent and accessible way to request public records, The Chattanoogan reports. County Attorney Janie Parks Varnell said the system is part of a broader modernization effort to improve access to government information, efficiency and accountability by reducing reliance on paper-based processes.

Students at Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law (LMU Law) in Knoxville will be able to take high-level, specialized courses at three ABA-accredited schools for no cost starting in spring 2026, the ABA Journal reports. Through a course-sharing agreement, Tennessee students will have access to online courses at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio and Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles. Administrators say the agreement will expand access to niche courses, reduce administrative burdens and enrich learning by connecting students across institutions. The long-term goal is to balance participation among the schools and potentially expand the program to more law schools. “Even though our part-time hybrid students already attend law school with students from all over the country, the opportunity to actually be enrolled in classes with students enrolled in different law schools will enrich their law school experiences,” said LMU Law Dean Matthew Lyon.

Dickson County government has provided $15,000 to the 23rd District Recovery Court to purchase a pickup truck for the program. According to a press release, the money comes from settlements reached between pharmaceutical companies and state and local governments to address the opioid crisis. The program will use the truck to transport equipment and supplies for participants in the court’s sober living residences. The recovery court provides services to residents who have been ordered by the court to seek treatment and monitored recovery due to addiction. The 18-month program offers housing, employment, transportation and comprehensive treatment services. According to the court, about 50 recovering addicts are served each year.

The TBA Administrative Law Section will host its annual forum on Dec. 11 from 9 a.m. to 12:30 p.m CST. Save the date and watch for more information coming soon to the TBA website. Section members receive discounted registration. Not a section member yet? Get started here.

On Aug. 19, the Supreme Court of Tennessee suspended 73 attorneys for failing to complete annual continuing legal education requirements in 2024. View the order or see the full list online, including those who have been reinstated in the last few days. Attorneys suspended for not completing CLE requirements in 2019 and 2024 also recently were reinstated. Access all administrative suspension lists dating back to 2005.

In July, the 6th Circuit issued its opinion in Kean v. Brinker International, Inc., affirming the lower court’s denial of summary judgment to the employee, reversing its grant of summary judgment to the employer, and vacating its refusal to impose heavier evidentiary sanctions on the employer.[1]

Termination for Not “Living the Chili’s Way”

This suit arose from the termination of a 59-year-old employee, who was general manager of one of the most profitable Chili’s restaurants in the Nashville market.[2]  The employee was allegedly terminated for creating a toxic culture and “not living the Chili’s way.”[3] He then was replaced as general manager by an employee more than 25 years younger than him with no managerial experience.[4] The employee filed suit for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).[5]

Of course, the ultimate question boiled down to “why did the employer fire the employee?”[6] Unfortunately for the employer, “[t]he answer is complicated,” as no one at Chili’s could remember why they actually fired the employee, and the employer destroyed all original documents related to his employment and the reason for his termination.[7]

As evidence of age discrimination, the employee highlighted that he was one of the oldest managers in the region, and that other members of management would call him “Old Man,” “Pops,” and “Grandpa,” and talk about his “old-school” management style.[8] He also claimed the employer had a trend of terminating older employees and replacing them with younger ones.[9]

Meanwhile, the employer’s proffered reason for his termination (toxic “culture”) seemed curious because by every objective measure, the employee was a high performing manager and received positive reviews on engagement surveys from those he managed.[10] Furthermore, the ultimate decision-maker had never even visited the restaurant the employee managed prior to the meeting at which he was terminated, so it was unclear how she could know anything of the location’s “culture.”[11]

No Independent Recollection

A few days after his termination, the employee notified the employer that he was suspicious of the reason for his termination, particularly in light of the lack of documentation, and would “get to the bottom of this with his attorney.”[12] Despite the employee’s comment, the employer failed to maintain any documentation regarding the employee, including performance reviews and all emails related to his termination.[13] In a sentence every defense attorney is sure to hear echo in their nightmares, the 6th Circuit noted that “[c]ompounding the destruction of relevant evidence, not one of the involved management team ... has any independent recollection of either their role in terminating [employee] or why the decision was made.”[14] Rather, “[t]he only individual with any independent recollection of the relevant events is [employee] himself.”[15]

In fact, the only document available at all was a report compiled by the employer after the employee’s termination that apparently contains personal notes and copies of emails circulated amongst members of the management team (the report).[16] This document had not been turned over to the EEOC as part of its investigation.[17] Over the employee’s objections, the district court found the report admissible and relied on it in its ultimate decision in the employer’s favor.[18]

The District Court’s Decision

Despite this evidentiary quagmire, the district court granted the employer summary judgment, finding that while the employee had made out his prima facie case, he had not rebutted the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for his termination (i.e., his purported failure to live the Chili’s way).[19] The district court also granted in part and denied in part the employee’s motion for evidentiary sanctions.[20] While the court required the employer to pay the employee’s fees and costs, it refused to impose any additional sanctions.[21] It based its refusal on the fact that the employer’s failure to implement a consistent document-retention policy and failure to implement a litigation hold was “grossly negligent” but not “intentional.”[22] Additionally, the district court denied the employee’s motion for summary judgment.[23]

The 6th Circuit Finds the Report Inadmissible & Orders Consideration of Sanctions

First, the 6th Circuit took issue with the district court’s admission of the report. The court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 901 (Rule 901) is clear that a proponent must be able to produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.[24] Unfortunately for the employer, the alleged author of the document testified that she had “no independent recollection” of the subject matter of the report or its creation.[25] The court took this to mean that she effectively disclaimed authorship.[26] The only witness the employer did proffer to authenticate the document (1) did not author the document, (2) did not witness its creation, and (3) had not discussed its creation with others.[27] Accordingly, the court found she did not have personal knowledge of the report and could not authenticate it.[28] The court further highlighted that the employers “lack of a document-retention policy and subsequent failure to implement a litigation hold has contributed almost exclusively to this gap in the record.”[29]

Furthermore, the 6th Circuit held that the report on its face appeared incomplete, as some unattributed comments were located in the document.[30] Additionally, there was nothing to assure the court that relevant emails were not omitted, a possibility the court found “troubling.”[31] Based upon all of this, the 6th Circuit ultimately found that the report was inadmissible under Rule 901,[32] and ultimately vacated the district court’s ruling on sanctions, remanding the matter “so the district court can determine an appropriate sanction beyond fees and costs” for the employer’s spoliation of evidence[33].

The 6th Circuit Finds Employee Has Created a Genuine Issue of Fact as to Pretext

Next, the 6th Circuit found that, particularly in light of the inadmissibility of the report, the employee had alleged sufficient facts to allow a trier of fact to find the employer’s proffered reason for the employee’s termination was pretextual.[34] The court noted that “despite stating that ‘culture’ was the reason for [employee’s] termination, the employer did not rely on any of its objective metrics for evaluating ‘culture.’”[35] Second, the employer “did not appear to follow its own policy and procedures in terminating” the employee.[36] Finally, the employee had offered evidence that the employer “was cultivating a youthful ‘culture’ at Chili’s” that he did not fit.[37] Altogether, the 6th Circuit felt that this constellation of evidence could guide a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s proffered reason was in fact pretext.[38] Accordingly, the 6th Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.[39]

Moving Forward

Kean serves as a firm reminder to employers and their counsel that appropriate, contemporaneous documentation is still king when it comes to defending an adverse employment action. It might also be a good reminder for defense counsel to review document-retention policies with clients and ensure that clients know when a litigation hold is needed. Furthermore, documentation should be carefully preserved, especially when an employee or former employee has hinted at getting an attorney or pursuing litigation.

Bethany Westcott Wilson is an associate of Kramer Rayson LLP in Knoxville where she practices labor and employment law, focusing on complex federal and state leave law issues. She graduated from Lee University in 2017 and The University of Tennessee College of Law in 2024. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court on Aug. 21 suspended 25 attorneys for failure to pay the annual registration fee; 13 of whom also failed to file proof that client funds are held in an IOLTA-compliant account. View the fee suspension order and IOLTA suspension order. Three lawyers have been reinstated since the list came out: two who had been suspended in 2024 and one in 2025. See the list of all lawyers suspended and reinstated for fee and IOLTA violations in 2025 or access all administrative suspensions dating back to 2005.

Introduction

One could argue that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a faculty member of a religious school to successfully prosecute an employment discrimination claim. Why? In the words of James Madison, “the scrupulous policy of the Constitution” is to guard against “political interference with religious affairs.”[1] Stated in more contemporary terms, the “ministerial exception” precludes courts from adjudicating claims brought against religious institutions by “key employees.”

The “ministerial exception” is a doctrine derived from the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The amendments elevate the interests of “religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission” above society’s interests in the enforcement of employment discrimination laws.[2]

The Supreme Court has long protected the right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters of faith, doctrine and internal governance.[3] The modern “ministerial exception” recognizes that the “power to appoint and remove ministers and other church officials is the power to control the church.”[4] Accordingly, the First and Fourteenth Amendments dictate that courts recognize the autonomy of religious institutions to select individuals who will play key roles in advancing the institution’s religious mission.

In Pulsifer v. Westshore Christian Academy,[5] the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether Aaron Pulsifer, a dean of students and assistant principal for a private Christian elementary school in Muskegon Heights, Michigan, could maintain employment discrimination claims against his employer.[6] Pulsifer sued Westshore Christian Academy (WCA) under a variety of state and federal employment laws. The district court granted summary judgment to WCA, holding that the federal Constitution “precludes review of the Academy’s employment decisions vis-à-vis Pulsifer because he performed important religious functions at the school.”[7] In short, the “ministerial exception” doomed Pulsifer’s claims, and Pulsifer appealed.

Case Summary

According to its founder, WCA was established to “bring affordable Christian education to inner city youth in the Muskegon area,” and WCA viewed its educational role as central to the religious development of students.[8] WCA terminated Pulsifer’s employment in August of 2022.[9]  Pulsifer, an African American male, claimed that his employment was terminated by WCA in retaliation for his having complained about discriminatory pay practices and for his having reported negative information about WCA’s primary financial supporter.[10] Moreover, Pulsifer argued that the “ministerial exception” did not apply to him because his role at the school required many routine secular administrative tasks, e.g., scheduling, student discipline and record keeping.[11]  WCA argued that the “ministerial exception” did apply to Pulsifer’s role because he performed a number of vital religious functions.

To answer the question of whether Pulsifer fell within the “ministerial exception,” the court looked to two Supreme Court cases for guidance — Hosanna-Tabor[12] and Our Lady of Guadalupe[13]. These cases provide several rules that are important to the “ministerial exception” analysis. The first rule is that the “ministerial exception” is not limited to churches.[14] Schools and other institutions whose missions involve religious education are covered because of their obvious religious characteristics. Second, the exception applies to more than “ministers,” or those with similar titles, and extends to other employees “who play an important role in advancing the institution’s religious mission.”[15] Third, while an employee’s title and training may be relevant, “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”[16] In short, an employee’s inclusion within the exception turns on whether he or she is involved in religious functions, such as leading worship, teaching the faith, or providing pastoral care and guidance.

Applying these rules to Pulsifer’s case, the court noted that the school’s mission statement articulated the goal of helping students “grow in their relationship with Christ, become life-long learners, to actively serve their community, and pursue Christian leaderships.”[17] Thus, there was no dispute that WCA was the type of religious entity that could avail itself of the “ministerial exception.”

In his role as Dean of Students/Assistant Principal, Pulsifer was expected to guide the students’ spiritual formation and be a “spiritual leader.”[18] In addition, Pulsifer led morning devotions for staff meetings and school board meetings, and he was in charge of two WCA after-school religious youth programs, which were public-facing efforts designed to convey the school’s religious message.[19] Finally, Pulsifer played a critical role in conducting communal prayer with board members and staff. In short, these vital religious functions placed Pulsifer’s position within the “ministerial exception.”[20]

Finally, the court found Pulsifer’s argument — that he performed duties typical of secular administrators — to be unpersuasive.[21] Like the elementary school teachers in Our Lady of Guadalupe, who fell within the ministerial exception despite the fact that they performed many of the same functions as secular teachers, Pulsifer’s secular activities did not determine whether his role fell within the “ministerial exception.” Here, because Pulsifer performed important religious functions, the “ministerial exception” did apply, and the 6th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment.[22] 

Harder Questions

The application of the “ministerial exception” to Pulsifer, who served as the dean of students at a private Christian school, simply was not much of a stretch for the court. However, one could imagine a number of scenarios that would present more difficult calls. For example, would a football coach at a Christian school whose only religious activity was leading the team in the rote recitation of the “Lord’s Prayer” qualify for the exemption? Do employees who are engaged exclusively in the technical side of worship production (e.g., lights, sound, slides, instruments, cameras, Facebook feeds) play key roles in advancing the mission and message of a religious institution? Would it matter to the “ministerial exception” analysis if the claimant was known to not hold any religious beliefs?

Tips for Practitioners

Pulsifer underscores how important it can be for a religious institution to formalize a mission statement that makes the religious characteristics of the enterprise obvious. In addition, job descriptions and offer letters that document religious responsibilities can be helpful in establishing the “ministerial exception” as a defense to employment claims.

Jason Ensley is a past chair of the TBA’s Labor & Employment Section Executive Council. He is employed as labor and employment counsel for a global transportation and logistics company.  He serves on the board of elders at his church and has always been fascinated with the “ministerial exception.” 

In just the last seven months, since President Donald Trump has taken office, the country has seen a proliferation of ICE (Immigration & Customs Enforcement) Encounters - I-9 audits, raids and warrants. In this article, I will explore the difference among the various encounters and how to prepare and respond to each.

Introduction

In Trump 1.0, we saw between 6,000 and 6,500 ICE I-9 audits in the two fiscal years where there were ICE audits. In FY2020, their goal was 12,000, but COVID destroyed that target. During the same two-year period, there were approximately 50 ICE raids, with the first one taking place in Bean Station, Tennessee, in April 2018. According to Border Czar Tom Homan, ICE’s goal in FY2025 is 12,000 to 15,000 ICE I-9 audits. To date, ICE has not released any data on the number of audits or raids.

Raids have returned after their discontinuance from March 2020 to January 2025. It is unknown how many ICE raids have been conducted in the last seven months, but the number is not as high as you might think because many of the ICE enforcement actions seemingly reported in the press are not actual raids. Rather, many of the actions are the service of an agency warrant, “Knock and Talk” actions without a warrant, and ICE I-9 audits with ICE agents wearing tactical gear. An agency warrant is signed by an official of the Department of Homeland Security and does not give ICE the authority to enter non-public areas of a business. If an employer receives such an agency warrant, an employer can or cannot give consent to locate the employee on premises. That decision is one for the employer. There is no right or wrong answer. “Knock and Talk” is when ICE enters the premises with a request to look around the facility. If an employer declines to consent, ICE cannot enter non-public areas.

Raids

In a worksite raid (also referred to as a targeted enforcement operation), ICE is primarily looking for criminal activity related to the employment of undocumented workers and the undocumented workers themselves. Raids are the culmination of months-long investigation into the targeted employer. Often, ICE uses a confidential informant to provide incriminating evidence.

Many employers believe they are a potential target of a raid. However, after one reviews the circumstances causing raids, most will determine they are not a likely target of a raid. To obtain a judicial search warrant signed by a U.S. District Court judge or a magistrate judge, ICE must disclose facts giving rise to a finding of probable cause. To seek such a warrant, an ICE agent must draft an Application for Search Warrant wherein all pertinent information is disclosed concerning the need for a search warrant. An employer’s location in a sanctuary city with a large Hispanic population is insufficient to be issued a search warrant. To date, there have been raids in many states, including Alabama, California, Florida, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas and Washington.

As a result of raids, many employers will face criminal liability, including knowingly hiring or employing an undocumented worker, tax and/or wire fraud, and harboring undocumented workers. To date, Trump 2.0 has brought criminal charges against several employers and many more are expected in the next few years.

ICE I-9 Audits

Historically, this has been the most likely ICE enforcement action. In an I-9 audit, ICE agents physically deliver a Notice of Inspection and subpoena to an employer, who then has a minimum of three days to provide the requested and subpoena documents. Often, one can obtain a short extension of time — from three to 10 days, for the production of the I-9 forms. ICE does not have statutory authority to demand production of the non-I-9 items within three days of service. At time of production, the employer must provide the I-9 forms of current employees and individuals whose employment was terminated within the last year. Additionally, it must provide payroll records and other related business records within a reasonable period of time.

After review by ICE’s forensic auditor, or maybe ICE’s AI auditor, ICE may issue notices to the employer. A Notice of Suspect Documents is a notice advising the employer that after a review of the employee’s I-9 and a check of government databases, ICE determined the employee was unauthorized to work. After receipt of such notice, the employer must notify the designated employee that ICE has determined that the work authorization documentation submitted by the employee is invalid and the employee must be given the opportunity to provide other documentation to prove authorization to work. If the employee cannot provide such documentation, the employer must terminate that employee or risk a fine for knowingly employing an undocumented worker.

Another possible notice is a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF), wherein ICE determines there have been substantive errors on the I-9 forms and/or the employer has knowingly hired/employed unauthorized workers. These NIFs keep getting larger and larger with it not being uncommon to see potential fines between $100,000 and $1,000,000. After receipt of a NIF, the employer’s counsel should seek to negotiate a lower fine. Fines can be reduced substantially in negotiations — often 25% to 40% less than the initial amount.

Preparation for an ICE Encounter

One of the most important aspects to prepare for an ICE encounter is for the employer to conduct an informal I-9 audit under the direction of an immigration compliance attorney. By conducting such, errors on the I-9 forms can be remediated, except for the timely completion of I-9 forms, which is covered by a five-year statute of limitations. Additionally, if the employer retains the supporting documentation, the audit can identify any documents that are suspected as fraudulent and investigate the situation.

If the employees are represented by a union, the union may request to bargain over the effects of an internal I-9 audit, such as the length of time employees have to remediate the I-9 by producing new documentation, whether the employees will be placed on leave if they cannot promptly provide new documentation, and any severance pay, if discharged for being unauthorized to work.[i]  If, as a result of the informal I-9 audit, an employer decides it wants to implement and enroll in E-Verify in a non-E-Verify state, it must bargain upon request with the reason over said enrollment.[ii]

Employers also need to have a plan of action on what to do if there is an ICE encounter. Each type of ICE encounter has distinct aspects of an employer response. For an ICE I-9 audit, the employer needs to be prepared for the right employee, HR manager, plant manager, etc., to accept the Notice of Inspection / subpoenas, and immediately communicate with legal counsel about the employer’s response. For an ICE raid, there is little that an employer can do except to obtain a copy of the search warrant, walk around with the ICE agents during the search, and obtain a copy of the list of seized documents. As for the agency warrant, this is where an employer has the most discretion. Because it is not a judicial warrant, an employer need not consent to any search of non-public areas and can decline to produce any employee listed on the warrant. However, it may comply with the agency warrant if it so desires. There is no perfect answer to this question, but employers need to have a consistent plan of action. Concluding the agency warrant, unions may request bargaining over an employer’s decision as to whether to consent to the search. Because this may affects the terms and conditions of employment, it is a mandatory subject of bargaining.

Conclusion

Every employer should be prepared to react to an ICE encounter, if one occurs. Through effective planning and training, any ICE encounter will not seem foreign to your management clients.

Bruce E. Buchanan is senior counsel at Littler Mendelson’s Nashville office, where he advises employers on immigration compliance issues, represents employers in ICE inspections/audits and DOJ/IER investigations, and conducts internal I-9 audits. Also, he practices labor law where he represents employers before NLRB and DOL’s Wage & Hour Division. Buchanan may be reached at bbuchanan@littler.com or (615) 540-3092.

Effective July 1, the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (commission) was dissolved with very little fanfare. That same day, the newly created Civil Rights Enforcement Division (CRED) of the Tennessee Attorney General’s office assumed responsibility for investigating, among other things, employment discrimination claims brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Disability Act. What does this governmental agency change mean for employment law practitioners?

First, something should be said about the commission’s demise. According to several state legislators, the commission had long been under scrutiny for alleged ineffective administration and slow claims processing. During debate on the Senate floor on April 21, the prime sponsor of the bill to dismantle the commission, Sen. John Stevens of Huntingdon (R), explained that the commission’s chronic backlog and slow claims processing was the genesis for the bill.[1] According to Stevens, “The people that are alleging that their civil rights have been violated deserve a timely and thorough investigation and a timely response from the State of Tennessee. The Human Rights Commission has not been delivering on that.”[2] During the same floor debate, Sen. Kerry Roberts of Springfield (R), further explained the reasons for ending the decades-old commission. Roberts described the commission as “an entity that has steadfastly been enormously ineffective” because “claims [] have languished without action.”[3] Roberts stated, “This is about ineffective administration.”[4] While the move to abolish the commission had its detractors, the bill easily passed the Republican controlled General Assembly on April 21 and was signed into law by Gov. Bill Lee on May 12. The new law is codified as Public Chapter No. 471.

One recurrent issue of concern voiced by opponents to the bill is whether the attorney general’s office would have a conflict of interest handling employment claims against the state. The bill sponsors countered this concern with citation to the case of State ex rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle.[5] In that case, an intra-governmental legal dispute arose between the Tennessee Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Tennessee Commission of Indian Affairs over the use of land containing a Native American burial ground. The trial court disqualified the attorney general’s office from simultaneously representing both agencies in the lawsuit based upon an ethical conflict of interest, reasoning that the attorney general potentially owed a greater duty of loyalty to the DOT than to the commission. The Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed. “Unlike the conflict-of-interest rules governing the conduct of lawyers representing private clients, the Attorney General is not necessarily prohibited from representing governmental clients whose interests may be adverse to each other. The majority rule is that the Attorney General, through his or her assistants, may represent adverse state agencies in intra-governmental disputes.”[6]

To better understand the new structure and procedures of CRED, the author interviewed Chief Deputy Attorney General Lacey Mase. According to Mase, the newly appointed director of CRED is Steven Griffin, who formerly served in the attorney general’s office as senior counsel for strategic litigation. CRED’s claim handling procedures are different than those of the commission. According to Mase, CRED’s procedures will closely follow those of the Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division.

CRED’s website contains an online complaint portal for initiating a complaint.[7] A complaint can also be submitted via U.S. Mail or by email to CRED. A complaint must be filed with CRED within 180 days of the challenged adverse employment action.[8] If more than 180 days have elapsed, or if the employee chooses not to file a complaint with CRED, an employee may file a lawsuit in either circuit or chancery court within one year of the challenged adverse employment action.[9]

Currently, CRED’s website contains scant information about claim-processing procedures. Because CRED is new, administrative plans are still being ironed out. With time, there likely will be more information posted to the website. According to Mase, once a complaint is filed, an intake specialist will review the complaint for jurisdiction purposes. If there are no jurisdictional defects, CRED will send a copy of the complaint and a letter to the employer (sometimes referred to as respondent) requesting a response. CRED will treat all information submitted to it by both parties as confidential. Unlike the EEOC, CRED does not provide an online case file portal. Party submissions (employer responses or employee rebuttals) can be made via email or a secure file transport protocol (SFTP) to a designated CRED staff member. Upon reviewing the employer’s response, CRED has several options. First, it may choose to close the claim. If it closes the claim, CRED will send a notice to both parties advising them of its decision and the employee’s right to pursue a direct court action. Second, CRED could suggest mediation or perhaps conciliation, depending on how it views the merits of the claim. Third, CRED could initiate formal requests for information, including requests for documents and testimony under oath. After CRED has gathered more detailed information through its investigative process, CRED again would have options. It could close the claim. It could suggest mediation or conciliation.  As a last resort, assuming mediation or conciliation has failed or are not viable options, CRED can initiate a lawsuit against the employer in chancery or circuit court.

Unlike the commission procedures, the CRED process appears more fluid and flexible. CRED may or may not request a rebuttal from the employee. It may or may not choose to initiate a formal investigation or suggest mediation. CRED will not conduct hearings or adjudicate the merits of claims as the commission formerly had the authority to do. The new amendments to the THRA do not vest CRED with authority to conduct hearings.[10] Mase explained that one important goal for CRED is to provide parties with a timely response. Given the one-year limitation period for an employee’s private cause of action, CRED is cognizant of the dilemma that an employee could face if CRED’s decision to pass on a claim is made beyond the one-year limitations period. To that end, CRED will attempt to address claims as quickly as possible. However, as Mase pointed out, each claim will be handled on a case-by-case basis, and timelines are not guaranteed.

One final important note should be made. In late June, CRED entered into a worksharing agreement with the EEOC. The worksharing agreement ensures claimants in Tennessee continue to have 300 days to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. It also allows CRED to dual-file claims with the EEOC on behalf of Tennessee employees and to transfer complaints to the EEOC for further investigation, as needed.

Doug Hamill is a member of Mikel & Hamill PLLC in Chattanooga, and former chair of the TBA Labor & Employment Section. He primarily represents individuals in employment law matters. He can be reached at dhamill@mhemploymentlaw.com.