The TBA Mentoring Committee, in collaboration with the TBA Young Lawyers Division, will hold a special event — "Developing Lawyers, Developing Leaders: A CLE on Mentorship and Professional Excellence" — on Jan. 30, 2026, at Belmont University College of Law's Baskin Center. Make plans now to join TBA President Heidi Barcus; Marshall County General Sessions Court Judge Lee Bussart; University of Tennessee Winston College of Law professor Joan Heminway; Amy Schmisseur, chair of Belmont University's Department of Communication Studies; Joseph Hubbard of Polsinelli; and Toyin Edogun of Bass Berry & Sims as they explore topics of mentorship, leadership and communication across one's legal career. The day of "Mocktails and Mentorship" will include lunch and three hours of CLE credit, followed by a networking event and the opportunity to mix mocktails together. Because good conversations are meant to be shared, lawyers who register for this course are invited to bring a colleague with them at no additional cost.

The Tennessee Supreme Court on Nov. 21 suspended Maury County lawyer James Michael Marshall from the practice of law for five years, with two years to be served on active suspension and the remainder on probation. The court found that while representing a client, Marshall submitted a factually inaccurate pleading, then failed to correct the error and failed to reasonably communicate with his client regarding the error. Marshall entered a conditional guilty plea and acknowledged his conduct violated Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.1(b) and 8.4(a).

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of first impression: Does a private cause of action for retaliation exist in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794? For at least the last 25 years, we have assumed that it does, often analyzing Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims based on precedent interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Those statutes, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, have express anti-retaliation provisions. But we have never addressed—nor seemingly had reason to address—whether, and if so where, a retaliation cause of action lies in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We are now faced with that question. Porter Smith sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the State of Michigan under § 504 for (1) failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his disability, and (2) retaliating against him for making an accommodation request and challenging its denial through legal action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the failure-to-accommodate claim, but the retaliation claim proceeded to trial. The jury found for Defendants. On appeal, Smith brings a handful of challenges stemming from the trial itself, one of which begs the question before us. Most relevantly, he argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it instructed the jury that the causation standard for a retaliation claim under the Act was “sole causation.” As explained below, we hold that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a cause of action for retaliation. Based on this conclusion and for other reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

On Nov. 21, the Tennessee Supreme Court suspended Davidson County lawyer Robert Joseph Turner from the practice of law for one year, with 30 days to be served on active suspension and the remainder on probation subject to Turner engaging a practice monitor. Turner was retained to represent a client in a civil matter. During the pending litigation, at least five separate associates employed by Turner were assigned to handle the litigation, although he remained counsel of record. Over a four year period, Turner, or an associate assigned to the matter who Turner was supervising, failed to appear for hearings on multiple occasions, missed multiple deadlines and failed to comply with orders to contact the court. In dismissing the matter, the trial court cited Turner’s failure to properly represent his client and comply with court orders. Turner agreed to a conditional guilty plea acknowledging his conduct violated Tennessee Rules of Professional 1.3 and 5.1.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Arsen Sarkisov is a citizen of Russia who has lived in the United States for at least two decades without legal status. Since 2013, he has been subject to a final order of removal. Several years ago, Sarkisov filed a self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) alleging that his former U.S.-citizen spouse subjected him to physical and emotional abuse. After the petition was granted, Sarkisov moved to reopen his immigration proceedings under a special rule for VAWA petitioners. To satisfy the rule, the VAWA petitioner must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” The Attorney General, through her designee the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), concluded that Sarkisov did not meet that standard. Sarkisov petitioned for review. As a matter of first impression, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that Sarkisov did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. But because the BIA’s determination was not erroneous, we DENY the petition for review.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) allows the Attorney General to cancel the deportation of an otherwise deportable noncitizen if that noncitizen establishes four preconditions to relief. Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir. 2021); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The four preconditions to relief are met if the noncitizen demonstrates: (1) continuous physical presence for a minimum of 10 years prior to the cancellation application; (2) he has been a person of “good moral character” during that period; (3) he has no convictions of a disqualifying offense; and (4) he has established that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the [noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child” who is a U.S. citizen or lawfully admitted permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D). The INA defines “child” as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age[.]” Id. § 1101(b)(1). An immigration judge (“IJ”) granted Petitioner Roderico Filadelfo Perez-Perez cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(D) in 2020, when his youngest daughter and qualifying “child,” Ady Perez-Velasquez, was seventeen years old. The government appealed, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not resolve the case until 2025, at which point it determined that Ady was over twenty-one and therefore no longer a qualifying “child” under the INA. As a result, the BIA vacated Perez-Perez’s cancellation of removal and ordered him removed to Guatemala. Because we now hold that the correct time to ascertain the age of a qualifying “child” under § 1229b(b)(1)(D) on an application for cancellation of removal is when the IJ issues its decision, we grant Perez-Perez’s petition for review and reverse the decision of the BIA.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. A Michigan jury convicted Michon Houston of first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and felony firearm. Claiming to possess new evidence showing ineffective assistance of counsel, Houston petitions for habeas relief—for the second time. The district court dismissed the petition for failing to satisfy the gate-keeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) and for untimeliness. Because Houston satisfies neither the gate-keeping nor equitable-tolling requirements, we AFFIRM.

In 2006, the Defendant, Joshua Lee Shaw, pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a Schedule II substance with intent to deliver, a Class C felony, and simple possession of a Schedule VI substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to four years of supervised probation. He violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. The trial court ordered the Defendant’s punishment for the violation to be for “time served” and returned him to probation. The Defendant successfully completed the remainder of his probation. In 2024, the Defendant filed a petition to expunge his record of his two offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(k). After a hearing, the trial court declined his request. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred. We conclude that the Defendant does not meet the plain language requirements of an “eligible petitioner” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(k), and thus we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Kerion Dawson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to mitigated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence to be served as sixty days in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Rutherford County lawyer Mark Stephen Moore received a public censure from the Tennessee Supreme Court on Nov. 21. The court found that Moore entered the area of the Rutherford County Probate Court containing probate files and, without permission or authority from the clerk or court, removed one file and a portion of a second file. While the file was in his possession, he also placed two documents in the file not properly filed with the court. When the clerk contacted him later the same day to inquire about the removed file and documents, Moore initially denied his conduct. The following day, he admitted his conduct and returned all probate files or related documents in his possession. Neither removal of the files nor adding material to the files had any impact on any probate proceedings. Moore agreed to a conditional guilty plea acknowledging his conduct violated Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1 and 8.4(c).