Social media has become a persistent source of legal risk for employers. While private employers generally have broad discretion to discipline or terminate employees for volatile or controversial social media activity, that discretion is not unlimited. Termination decisions tied to online speech can implicate a complex overlay of federal and state laws, particularly where posts touch on protected activities, working conditions or whistleblowing activity.

This article outlines the primary legal risks for private employers and offers practical guidance for navigating termination decisions involving volatile social media posts.

At Will Employment Has Its Limits

Most private-sector employment in the United States is "at-will," meaning employers may terminate employees for any reason or no reason at all — so long as the reason is not unlawful. Public employers operate under a different framework, as employee speech may implicate First Amendment protections. For private employers, however, constitutional free speech principles generally do not apply.

At-will status does not insulate employers from liability when a termination decision intersects with statutory or contractual protections.

Union Employees and 'Just Cause' Requirements

Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement typically may only be terminated for "just cause," and discipline for social media activity is often subject to grievance and arbitration procedures. In these cases, employer policies, consistency of enforcement, past practice and proportionality of discipline are critical.

Employment Contracts

Employment contracts come in all shapes and sizes, but many of them also require “just cause” for termination. Frequently, “just cause” is narrowly defined in the contract. So before making a termination decision with respect to an employee that has a contract, it is a good idea to review the specific wording of the contract to decide whether the employee can be terminated without constituting a breach of contract.

Federal and State Statutes: Legal Risks in Connection with Social Media Terminations

Even “at will” employees have federal and state statutory protections from unlawful terminations in connection with volatile social media posts.

Title VII, ADA and ADEA

Termination decisions may run afoul of federal or state discrimination or retaliation statutes if an employee’s social media post constitutes protected activity. Online advocacy — even outside the workplace — can qualify as protected opposition activity under these statutes if it reasonably opposes perceived discrimination. For example, an employee’s post saying that their employer discriminates against older workers likely would be protected under the ADEA, and the employee might be able to successfully pursue a retaliation claim if terminated for that social media post.

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)

The NLRA protects concerted activity related to terms and conditions of employment, even in non-union workplaces. Social media posts addressing pay, scheduling, safety, management treatment or workplace policies — particularly when made in coordination with or on behalf of coworkers — may fall within the Act’s protections. For example, an employee’s post saying that their employer is unfair to its employees and that the employees ought to form a union, likely would be protected under the NLRA.

Whistleblower Protections

Federal and state whistleblower laws may protect employees who disclose or complain about perceived legal violations. Social media posts alleging unlawful conduct by an employer can create retaliation risk, even where the allegations are ultimately shown to be untrue.

Focusing on Tennessee

Tennessee remains a relatively employer-friendly, at-will employment jurisdiction. Tennessee law does not provide broad statutory protections for lawful off-duty conduct or political speech by private employees. As a result, private employers in Tennessee generally retain substantial discretion to discipline or terminate employees for volatile or controversial social media posts.

That discretion is not absolute. Termination decisions still carry risk where they implicate federal or state discrimination or retaliation statutes, NLRA protections for concerted activity, or Tennessee whistleblower protections.

Examples of Higher Risk Jurisdictions: California and New York

California and New York illustrate how state law can significantly limit an employer’s discretion to terminate employees for off-duty social media activity. California law protects lawful off-duty conduct and political expression under multiple statutes, while New York Labor Law § 201-d protects lawful political and recreational activities conducted off duty.

In both states, termination decisions based on social media posts are vulnerable where the employer cannot demonstrate a clear nexus between the post and legitimate business harm. Employers face heightened risk when discipline appears driven by disagreement with an employee’s viewpoint rather than demonstrable workplace impact.

The Importance of Social Media Policies

A clear, well-drafted and consistently enforced social media policy remains one of an employer’s strongest defenses. Effective policies should identify prohibited conduct with reasonable specificity, tie restrictions to legitimate business interests, avoid overbroad prohibitions that could chill protected activity and be enforced consistently.

Practical Guidance for Employers

Before terminating an employee for a volatile social media post, employers should consider:

• Whether the post implicates protected activity
• Whether the post could be construed as concerted activity under the NLRA
• Whether the employer’s social media policy is being properly and consistently applied
• Whether lesser discipline would adequately address the issue

Key Takeaways

Private employers generally have broad discretion to discipline employees for volatile social media posts, but legal risk increases when termination decisions intersect with discrimination, retaliation, concerted activity, whistleblowing or state off-duty conduct protections. The most effective risk-management strategies remain clear policies, thoughtful legal analysis, documented business justifications and consistent enforcement.

Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult counsel regarding specific situations.

Chuck Lee is vice-chair of Miller & Martin’s Litigation Department and practices out of the firm’s Chattanooga office.

Bailey Lowe joined the Chattanooga office of Miller & Martin as a litigation associate in 2025 after graduating from Emory University School of Law. 

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court is poised to decide several cases this term that could significantly impact employment law. These cases address complex issues ranging from government contractor immunity, pension plan withdrawal liability, to statutory protections for federal agency commissioners. Below is a brief review of the major cases under consideration and their potential implications for employers, employees, and federal agencies.

GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal: Derivative Sovereign Immunity and the Collateral Order Doctrine

On Nov. 10, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal,[1] a case that centers on whether government contractors can immediately appeal a court order denying a claim of derivative sovereign immunity under the collateral order doctrine. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in 2014, alleging that immigrant detainees who performed janitorial services and other low paying work for the Aurora Immigration Processing Center's (AIPC) were in essence forced labor in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)[2], among other claims.

GEO, the government contractor operating AIPC, asserted that its actions were authorized and directed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) through a government contract, and therefore it should be shielded by derivative sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs countered that GEO’s broad discretion in facility operations removed this protection. The district court sided with the plaintiffs, granting their motion for summary judgment and denying GEO’s. GEO appealed, but the 10th Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

A circuit split currently exists: the 2nd, 6th, and 11th circuits hold that denial of derivative sovereign immunity is an appealable collateral order, whereas the 9th, 4th, 5th, 7th and 10th circuits disagree. The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision will clarify whether such denials are immediately appealable, impacting how government contractors defend themselves in employment-related litigation.

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund: Withdrawal Liability under ERISA

Another significant case is M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund, [3] which addresses how withdrawal liability is calculated when employers exit multiemployer pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).[4] The petitioners withdrew from the IAM National Pension Fund in 2018. ERISA prescribes that withdrawal liability calculations should be based on actuarial assumptions coinciding with the “end of the plan year.”[5]

In this case, the plan year ended on Dec. 31, 2017, and actuarial assumptions were set before that date. However, when calculating the withdrawal liability, a different discount rate was applied after the measurement date, significantly increasing the petitioners’ liability. The core question is whether ERISA mandates the use of year-end actuarial assumptions or allows for post-measurement changes.

This issue has created a circuit split: the 2nd Circuit requires calculations as of the last day of the prior year using assumptions in effect on that day,[6] while the D.C. Circuit permits using assumptions calculated after the measurement date.[7] The Supreme Court’s decision will affect employers participating in multiemployer pension plans, potentially altering withdrawal liability expectations and influencing future participation and exit strategies.

Trump v. Slaughter: Statutory Removal Protections and Separation of Powers

Perhaps the most closely watched employment law case this term is Trump v. Slaughter.[8] Earlier this year, President Trump removed two Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, with the plaintiffs arguing that these actions failed to meet the statutory “cause” standard required for removal.[9] Bedoya later resigned, leaving Slaughter as the sole plaintiff. Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment was granted, ordering her reinstatement, but the Supreme Court stayed this ruling pending review.

Slaughter relies on Humphrey's Executor v. United States,[10] a 1935 Supreme Court case which established that Congress could constitutionally restrict the president's removal power for officials of independent agencies like the FTC. The government contends that Humphrey’s Executor should be overturned on the grounds that it conflicts with the Vesting Clause of Article II of the Constitution, as interpreted under the unitary executive theory. The Supreme Court’s taking of this appeal appears to signal that the court is now re-examining whether these legislative removal protections are constitutional and if Humphrey's Executor should be overruled. The court will also consider whether federal courts may prevent a person’s removal from public office through equitable or legal relief.

Oral arguments in this case were presented before the court on December 8 with Solicitor General Sauer referring to Humphrey’s Executor as a “decaying husk.” During the proceedings, several justices expressed questions and concerns, particularly about the potential disruptions that might result from overturning Humphrey's Executor. Justice Sotomayor notably remarked that granting the petitioner’s request would fundamentally “destroy the structure of government.” Many of the justices’ inquiries focused on distinguishing between purely executive, purely legislative, and hybrid agency functions, in order to evaluate how the decision could affect different government agencies depending on their roles. Justice Barrett may have tipped her hand by commenting that Humphrey's Executor has been "eroded" over the years. The oral arguments in this case were notably contentious, a dynamic likely fueled by the significant political undertones inherent in the question before the court and the heightened polarization between political parties at present.

This case has broad implications for employment law and the independence of federal agencies. The outcome could affect not only the FTC but also other independent agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

Nawara v. Cook County [11]: Can an Employee Without a Disability Recover Under the ADA?

In this case, the plaintiff was placed on a leave of absence after a series of confrontations with co-workers, pending completion of a fitness-for-duty examination. At trial, the jury determined that requiring the plaintiff to undergo a fitness-for-duty test was a violation of 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),[12] but did not award any damages. Upon post-trial motions of both parties, the district court ruled that, despite the jury’s finding of a violation of §12112(d)(4), the employer was not obligated to provide back pay to the plaintiff, reasoning that the fitness-for-duty requirement was not based on the plaintiff’s actual or perceived disability.[13] According to the court, use of unlawful medical examinations only constitutes unlawful discrimination subject to back pay damages when it is done in such a way that it discriminates against a qualified individual on the basis of disability. Both parties then appealed.

The 7th Circuit disagreed with the district court on the issue of back pay.[14] It concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay due to the employer’s violation of the ADA, even though the plaintiff did not have, nor was perceived to have, a disability.

On Sept. 12, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to clarify whether the ADA is violated — and whether damages are appropriate — when an employer requires an unsupported medical examination of an employee, regardless of whether the employee has or is perceived to have a disability. Currently, the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 10th circuits hold that an employee cannot recover damages under the ADA without an ADA-defined disability, whereas the 6th and 7th circuits allow recovery regardless of whether the employee has a disability or perceived disability.

As of now, the court has not yet decided whether it will hear the case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases are likely to reshape key aspects of employment law. Whether addressing the appealability of immunity denials, clarifying pension withdrawal calculations, redefining statutory protections for federal agency commissioners or appropriate construction of the ADA, the outcomes will have lasting effects on employers, employees, and the operations of government agencies.

Richard D. Bennett is a partner at Phelps Dunbar LLP in it's Memphis office. He is a member of the Labor and Employment and Employment Litigation Practice Groups at Phelps and a graduate of the University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. He may be reached at rick.bennett@phelps.com or 901-259-7121. 

Rachel Ducker is an associate with Phelps Dunbar LLP in its Memphis office. She works with the firm’s Employment Litigation Practice Group at Phelps and is a graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law. She may be reached at rachel.ducker@phelps.com or 901-259-7136.

The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals recently jettisoned a required prima facie element for establishing a Title VII religious accommodation claim based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis. No longer must a plaintiff show that he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with an employment requirement that conflicts with his sincerely held religious beliefs or practices. In Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC,[1] the 6th Circuit held that a court cannot dismiss a Title VII religious accommodation claim “simply because the plaintiff’s only harm is having to choose between violating his religious beliefs and violating workplace policies.”[2]

Jeffrey and Jessica Bilyeu, a Christian married couple, worked at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which is managed by UT-Battelle. In August 2021, UT-Battelle announced a mandatory Covid vaccination policy, to which the Bilyeus objected on religious grounds. After the deadline passed for accommodation applications, UT-Battelle announced that employees who requested a religious accommodation would have to go on unpaid leave until the end of the pandemic. However, the indefinite unpaid leave requirement did not apply to employees who were granted medical accommodations. Shortly before the mandatory policy took effect, Mrs. Bilyeu was granted a medical accommodation because she was a breastfeeding mother. As a result, she did not miss work or pay. Mr. Bilyeu, however, was forced to go on indefinite unpaid leave. 

The Bilyeus then sued UT-Battelle, asserting Title VII claims for religious disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation arising from the vaccine mandate. Mrs. Bilyeu’s claims were dismissed by the district court for lack of standing, which the 6th Circuit upheld. As for Mr. Bilyeu’s claims, the district court dismissed them on summary judgment solely because Mr. Bilyeu did not suffer a materially adverse employment action, i.e., that unpaid leave was not considered materially adverse because Mr. Bilyeu is “simply not being paid for time that he has not worked.”[3]

The 6th Circuit reversed the summary judgment rulings as to Mr. Bilyeu. In doing so, the court explained that the Supreme Court’s holding in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis[4] required a new analysis. In Muldrow, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require a plaintiff to show “that the harm incurred was significant” or that it was “serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.”[5] The Supreme Court thus eliminated the “material” requirement that lower courts had added to the prerequisite of an adverse employment action.[6] Prior to Muldrow, the 6th Circuit’s Title VII prima facie standard required a showing that the plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action, which was interpreted to require a “material adverse action.”[7] But Muldrow has now abrogated that 6th Circuit standard.[8] Because the district court had solely relied on the now-abrogated “materially adverse” standard, the 6th Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment.[9]

Most importantly, the 6th Circuit in Bilyeu revised the religious accommodation prima facie standard. Previously, the standard required a plaintiff to show that he: (1) holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) has informed the employer about the conflicts; and (3) was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.[10] The 6th Circuit had long held that a plaintiff cannot satisfy prong three of this standard without showing that he has suffered “some independent harm caused by a conflict between his employment obligation and his religion.”[11] But the 6th Circuit found that Muldrow’s holding was squarely at odds with the third prong of this standard.

The “independent harm” requirement clashes head-on with Muldrow. Saying that an employee needs to suffer a harm that is independent from having to violate his religious beliefs to comply with a policy at work is just another way of saying that the employee needs to face some harm beyond the discrimination itself. After all, the harm in a failure-to-accommodate case is the inability to comply with workplace policies while also complying with the tenets of the employee’s faith. So just as Muldrow bars courts from forcing Title VII plaintiffs to show that they have suffered a “materially adverse impact,” we hold that, under Muldrow, a court cannot dismiss a Title VII complaint simply because the plaintiff’s only harm is having to choose between violating his religious beliefs and violating workplace policies.[12]

Thus, the 6th Circuit struck the third prong (dubbed the “independent harm” requirement”) from its prima facie standard for a Title VII religious accommodation claim. Because summary judgment was granted on Mr. Bilyeu’s accommodation claim because of the now-abrogated “independent harm” requirement, the 6th Circuit vacated the district court’s decision.[13]

So what does the prima facie standard for a Title VII religious accommodation claim look like now, and how will this affect claims going forward? The 6th Circuit did not articulate a new standard. However, it seems logical to conclude that the prima facie standard now only includes two prongs: (1) that the plaintiff holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; and (2) that the plaintiff has informed the employer about the conflict. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that (1) it offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or (2) it could not have reasonably accommodated the plaintiff’s religious beliefs without undue hardship.[14] Most disputes in religious accommodation claims focus on whether a reasonable accommodation was offered or whether no accommodation could be offered because of undue hardship. Thus, elimination of the “independent harm” prong does little to resolve most cases. However, it does allow cases with no backpay damages (but potential for compensatory damages) to move forward in litigation. Will this encourage more plaintiffs to assert religious accommodation claims even in the absence of lost wages? Time will tell.

Doug Hamill is a member of Mikel & Hamill PLLC in Chattanooga and former chair of the TBA Labor & Employment Section.  He primarily represents individuals in employment law matters.  He can be reached at dhamill@mhemploymentlaw.com.

An item in Tuesday's TBA Today attributed an Instagram post displaying a constituent's address to Metro Nashville Councilmember Rollin Horton. The post was anonymous and did not come from Horton. The original story has been corrected.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Under a law recently enacted in Michigan, therapists are free to offer their minor clients “counseling that provides assistance to an individual undergoing a gender transition.” M.C.L. § 330.1100a(20). But if a minor client (with his parents’ consent) seeks counseling to “change” his “behavior or gender expression” to align with his biological sex, his therapist can lose her license if she provides it. Id. The plaintiffs here offer counseling in the form of “talk therapy”: literally, spoken words and nothing more. They argue that this regime restricts their speech based on its content and viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs’ therapy amounts to conduct—specifically “treatment”—rather than speech. We disagree and reverse.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Sometimes government works. And sometimes it works best after a dialogue between and within the various branches. In 2020, Congress enacted the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act to establish a nationwide framework for regulating thoroughbred horseracing. That led to several non- delegation and anti-commandeering challenges to the validity of the Act throughout the country. The lead challenge—the facial non-delegation challenge—focused on the reality that the Act replaced several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, which became the Act’s primary rulemaker and which was not subordinate to the relevant public agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in critical ways. The first circuit to assess the validity of the law, the Fifth Circuit, declared the Act facially unconstitutional because it gave “a private entity the last word” on federal law. Nat’l Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Black (Black I), 53 F.4th 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2022); see id. at 888–89. In response to the Fifth Circuit’s decision and after oral argument in a similar case in our circuit, Congress amended the Act to give the Federal Trade Commission discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459, 5231–32 (2022). While the Constitution does not require constructive exchanges between Congress and the federal courts, it does not discourage them either, and good government sometimes benefits from them. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989). A productive dialogue occurred in this instance, and, from our perspective, it ameliorated the concerns underlying the non-delegation challenge. In Oklahoma v. United States, we upheld the Act against a facial non-delegation challenge and an anti-commandeering challenge. 62 F.4th 221, 225 (6th Cir. 2023). The Eighth Circuit took the same view. Walmsley v. FTC, 117 F.4th 1032, 1038–40 (8th Cir. 2024). The Fifth Circuit agreed with both courts with respect to the rulemaking power created by the Act. Nat’l Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Black (Black II), 107 F.4th 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2024). But it facially invalidated the law on the ground that the Act afforded the Horseracing Authority the power to enforce federal law “without the FTC’s say-so.” Id. at 421. The losing parties all filed petitions for writs of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held the various petitions while it considered a separate non- delegation challenge to another federal law that used a private entity in implementing the law. In FCC v. Consumers’ Research, the Court considered an as-applied challenge to the Federal Communications Commission’s Universal Service Fund, premised on the reality that the FCC relied on a private administrator’s policy recommendations in administering the program. 606 U.S. 656 (2025). The Court ruled that the program did not impermissibly delegate government authority to a private entity because the FCC retained final “decision-making authority.” Id. at 693. After its decision, the Court “GVR’d” the three certiorari petitions raising non-delegation challenges to the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act. That is to say, the Court granted each petition, vacated the lower court judgments, and remanded the cases for reconsideration in light of Consumers’ Research. That brings us to our second look at the Act. In view of the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Consumers’ Research and other recent decisions, we reject this facial challenge because the Act, as amended, gives the FTC, not the Horseracing Authority, the final say over the Act’s key rulemaking and enforcement provisions.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Luther Poynter was incarcerated in the Barren County Detention Center (“BCDC”) on December 25, 2020, for contempt of court due to his failure to pay child support. On December 28, BCDC moved Poynter to a general-population cell, where Scotty Wix and Timothy Guess were also housed. Within one minute and thirty seconds of Poynter entering the cell, Guess and Wix attacked him, punching him repeatedly in the head. Poynter suffered a traumatic brain injury from the assault and is permanently impaired. Collectively, Wix and Guess had assaulted other detained persons in their cells in BCDC eleven times before they attacked Poynter, but BCDC nevertheless continued to house them in general- population cells. Poynter, by and through his guardian and sister, Anita Fernandez, sued Aaron Bennett, in his official capacity as Barren County Jailer, and Barren County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Following discovery, Bennett and Barren County moved for summary judgment, arguing that Poynter failed to show that he suffered a constitutional violation. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that Poynter failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated or that Barren County was liable for the violation. Poynter timely appealed. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court’s summary-judgment ruling and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

READLER, Circuit Judge. Chicken Salad Chick, a fast-casual restaurant chain, hired Tawna Bowles to serve as a cashier/service-team member at a franchise location in northern Kentucky. Bowles, who suffers from arthritis in her knees, requested that she be allowed to sit for five minutes after every ten minutes that she stood while on the job. When Chicken Salad Chick denied her request, Bowles sued the restaurant chain under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). In her complaint, Bowles alleged that the company failed to accommodate her disability and refused to engage in the ADA’s interactive-accommodation process. The district court granted summary judgment to Chicken Salad Chick. Because Bowles’s requested accommodation is unreasonable as a matter of law and her interactive-process claim depends upon a viable reasonable-accommodation claim, we affirm.

Appellant, an attorney residing in Kansas but licensed in both Kansas and Tennessee, filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee’s professional privilege tax. A three-judge panel granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant commissioner of revenue, ruling that the tax did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the garnishment of an inherited Individual Retirement Account. Advanced Hearing Aid Group, LLC (“AHAG”), Gary Kelly, Kenneth Kelly, and Matthew Kelly (“Plaintiffs, ” collectively) filed an application for writ of garnishment in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas A. Stewart (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs sought to collect a judgment against Defendant stemming from a lawsuit over AHAG. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to garnish an IRA that Defendant inherited from his mother (“the Inherited IRA”). Defendant is both a fiduciary and beneficiary of the Inherited IRA. Defendant filed a motion to quash, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) and its exemption of certain retirement plans from garnishment. The Trial Court held that, while the Inherited IRA was exempt from garnishment initially, it lost its exempt status because Defendant made prohibited transactions from the Inherited IRA to a disqualified party, a revocable trust of which Defendant is a 50% or more beneficiary (“the Revocable Trust”). Defendant appeals, arguing that he essentially transferred the funds to himself, which all sides agree is permitted. We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) never applied to the Inherited IRA in the first place. We hold further that, even if the Inherited IRA had once been exempt, it stopped being exempt after Defendant’s prohibited transactions. We affirm as modified. Pursuant to AHAG’s operating agreement, AHAG is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal, the amount of which the Trial Court is to determine on remand.