DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Scott Williams filed this action against Addison Community Schools and the then-superintendent of the School District plus five members of the School Board in their individual and official capacities. On appeal, Williams challenges the district court’s denial of his partial motion for summary judgment as to his constitutional tort claim under the Fair and Just Treatment clause of the Michigan constitution, and he challenges its grant of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that same claim. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the district court’s decision and remand.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Federal law allows a “prevailing party” to seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees in suits against a federal agency unless the agency’s “position” was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). This case asks whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) was “substantially justified” in treating rifles fitted with bump stocks as illegal “machineguns.” In 2017, the ATF departed from its long-held view on the legality of bump stocks. Its new interpretation produced a flood of litigation. Eventually, a circuit split led the Supreme Court to resolve this question against the ATF. See Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 415 (2024). The district court in this case nevertheless found the ATF’s reading substantially justified and so refused to award attorney’s fees to the challengers. We must give deference to the district court’s finding. And the court acted reasonably because of the substantial judicial disagreement that this novel legal question produced. We thus affirm.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. In March 2022, police handcuffed and detained Ryan Franke outside a local recreational center on suspicion of domestic violence against his ex-wife. After handcuffing Franke, Officer Kenny Janes escorted him toward a police vehicle. During the walk to the vehicle, Franke yelled out to nearby family members, which led Janes to apply pain compliance techniques to keep Franke moving. Later, Janes allegedly twisted Franke’s wrist, causing injury. Franke brought this civil rights action, claiming that Janes used excessive force. The district court found that Janes is protected by qualified immunity and granted him summary judgment on that basis. Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the need for the amount of force applied, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for further proceedings.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Rihanna Buddi pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In advance of sentencing, and over Buddi’s objection, the district court classified her as a Tier II sex offender under SORNA. She was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, followed by twenty years of supervised release, which was fifteen years over the applicable advisory Guidelines range of five years flat. Because we find that Buddi is a Tier I offender under SORNA and that the district court erred procedurally in imposing her twenty-year term of supervised release, we REVERSE the district court’s ruling on Buddi’s objection regarding her SORNA classification, VACATE her supervised release sentence, and REMAND for resentencing.

Defendant, James Andrew Paige, appeals from his three convictions for rape, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the victim’s hearsay statements; (2) by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) by failing to inquire into defense counsel’s unintentional contact with a juror or declare a mistrial. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a new trial. Because we find that Defendant has failed to timely file his notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not support waiver of that requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Lee Cross, appeals as of right from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his probation was revoked at a January 4, 2023 “furlough termination” hearing without counsel and without a valid waiver, rendering the judgment void. The habeas corpus court denied relief, finding noncompliance with statutory filing requirements and concluding the petition failed to state a cognizable habeas corpus claim. Based on our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Juan Cerano, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari or supersedeas. Specifically, he contends that he is entitled to relief because he was twice punished for a single act in violation of double jeopardy and that merger of his convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child was improper. The Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed almost two and one-half months late; an issue pointed out by the State on appeal. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner has given no explanation for the untimely filing, and the nature of his double jeopardy issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Byron Becton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The juvenile court magistrate denied Appellant/Father’s petition for custody of the minor child on its finding that Tennessee was not the child’s home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Father filed a timely request for review by the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(A). Because the trial court’s order denying review fails to comply with section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E), it is vacated.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. The employee reported falling while walking down a concrete step at a jobsite, resulting in left elbow and wrist fractures. Thereafter, the employee alleged that he suffered from various other injuries and medical conditions that arose from the work accident. In its motion for summary judgment, the employer acknowledged the compensability of the employee’s left wrist and elbow injuries but asserted that the employee has not come forward with any evidence that any other medical diagnoses arose primarily from the work accident. It supported its dispositive motion with a statement of undisputed material facts and two physicians’ written reports and/or causation opinions. The trial court determined that the employer failed to meet its burden of production and denied its dispositive motion, and the employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.