READLER, Circuit Judge. In 2008, Fifth Third Bank began offering a cash-advance program called “Early Access.” The program enabled customers to “advance” money into their checking accounts (otherwise known as a loan). When a deposit was next made into a customer’s account, Fifth Third would withdraw the loan amount plus 10%. Fifth Third disclosed this 10% “transaction fee” in its standard Early Access terms and conditions, which form the contract at the heart of this dispute. In accordance with the requirements of federal law, the bank also disclosed that these loans had a 120% annual percentage rate. But there was a disconnect between these statements: Because the loans were repaid whenever customers next received a deposit into their accounts, the lengths of the loans were variable, meaning that it was impossible to calculate a standard APR for all loans. As a result, the vast majority of customers paid an APR higher than 120%. Based on this allegedly misleading APR term, William Klopfenstein sued the bank for breach of contract on behalf of a class of Early Access users. At trial, a jury agreed with Klopfenstein that Fifth Third breached the contract but, in the end, found that the bank was not liable for the breach due to the voluntary-payment defense, an Ohio law equitable defense to a breach-of-contract claim. See State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 86 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ohio 1949) (per curiam). As the Ohio courts have explained the defense, if a plaintiff “with full knowledge of the relevant facts” pays the defendant, “such payment cannot be recovered merely because the person who made the payment mistook the law as to his liability to pay.” City of Cleveland v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 109 N.E.3d 84, 114–15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Dickman, 86 N.E.2d at 7) (City of Cleveland I), rev’d on other grounds, 152 N.E.3d 172 (Ohio 2020) (City of Cleveland II). On appeal, the class contends that Fifth Third could not assert the voluntary-payment defense under Ohio law because the class members made a mistake of fact, not law. Ohio’s cases on the matter, however, point in all directions. As a result, we sua spontecertify to the Supreme Court of Ohio the questions set forth below in accordance with Supreme Court of Ohio Rule of Practice 9.02.

READLER, Circuit Judge. Julie Schulz Halbower, in her capacity as trustee of her family trust, sued her insurer for breach of contract based on a denial of insurance coverage. The district court dismissed the action due to the complaint’s lack of merit. On appeal, we take a different course. Because the parties did not adequately plead facts necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction, we remand the case to the district court to conduct further jurisdictional discovery.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. A Grand Rapids police officer frisked Fahirri Dannah during a traffic stop. Before the officer could complete the pat down, Dannah twisted away and started to run. Officers tackled him and wrestled with him until they could place handcuffs on him. Dannah filed this § 1983 action against several of the officers. The district court rejected the officers’ qualified-immunity defense, reasoning that a jury could find that they violated Dannah’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Because the officers did not violate any clearly established law, we reverse.

The Defendant, Bernard Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrianne Smith, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated domestic assault following a bench trial. The Defendant represented himself at these proceedings, although he was appointed an attorney as “counsel to assist,” also known as “standby counsel.” On appeal, the Defendant contends, inter alia, that he did not ask to represent himself, even with the aid of standby counsel, and that the trial court improperly required him to do so against his expressed wishes. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the Defendant that he was denied his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Roy Gene Nicholson, III, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of reckless aggravated assault, evading arrest, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-204 and that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to continue his trial, during which time the State procured a superseding indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bradley Michael Lesniewski, was convicted of possession of a handgun by a felon; possession of a firearm by a felon-prior felony drug conviction; false imprisonment; evading arrest; possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Heroin); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (0.5 grams or more of Methamphetamine); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Fentanyl); possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving while license is suspended, cancelled, or revoked. For these offenses, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand for the merger of two counts and the entry of corrected judgment forms.

The Defendant, Kenneth C. Davis, was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation and received a twelve-year sentence. The Defendant died while his motion for new trial was still pending, which prompted the Defendant’s counsel to file a motion to dismiss on the Defendant’s behalf, arguing that the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio should act to abate the Defendant’s entire case from the inception of the prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2019). The Defendant’s counsel filed an appeal from that decision pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the Defendant’s counsel contends that the trial court erred by relying on Al Mutory and declining to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio under these circumstances. Following supplemental briefing, we conclude that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3 to review the issue as presented. Further, we decline to extend the extraordinary judicial remedy of a writ of certiorari. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves a long-running custody dispute between unmarried parents. In this latest chapter of the litigation, the father filed a petition to modify, seeking to be named primary residential parent and/or increase his parenting time. The mother filed a counter- petition, seeking only a change in decision-making authority. The trial court denied the father’s petition but did make several changes to the parenting schedule. The trial court also granted the mother’s request to be named sole decision-maker for educational and extracurricular decisions and allowed her to obtain passports for the children. Finally, the trial court ordered the father to pay the mother’s attorney fees. The father appeals. We vacate in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings.

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro as well as attorney’s fees. Husband appealed. He argues the trial court’s award of alimony was error because the court miscalculated his income, because it errantly excluded certain evidence, and because it awarded the wrong type of alimony. He also argues that Wife’s attorney’s fees affidavit was insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This appeal requires us to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports: (1) at least one statutory ground for termination of Appellant’s parental rights; and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.