STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTONIO DEMETRIUS ADKISSON A/K/A ANTONIO DEMETRIUS TURNER JR. - Articles

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STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTONIO DEMETRIUS ADKISSON A/K/A ANTONIO DEMETRIUS TURNER JR.

Posted by: Azya Thornton on May 29, 2026

Head Comment: CAMPBELL concurring

Court: TN Supreme Court

Attorneys 1: Claiborne H. Ferguson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson

Attorneys 2: Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Frederick H. Agee, District Attorney General; and Hillary L. Parham, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Attorneys 3: Jason Gichner and Jessica Marie Van Dyke, and Lauren Gottesman, for the Amici Curiae, The Tennessee Innocence Project and The Innocence Project.

Attorneys 4: Jonathan P. Harwell, Sean P. Day, and Martha Dinwiddie, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Judge(s): BIVINS

Seventeen-year-old Antonio Demetrius Adkisson (a.k.a. Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.) (“the Defendant”) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of two victims. The Gibson County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) held a transfer hearing and found it appropriate to transfer the Defendant to the Gibson County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to be prosecuted as an adult. After a jury trial, during which the Defendant’s videotaped statements were admitted into evidence, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See State v. Adkisson, No. W2022-01009- CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2024). The Defendant requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging (1) the juvenile court lacked probable cause to believe he committed the charged offenses, as required for transfer by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his confession at trial because he did not validly waive his right to remain silent and his confession was involuntary. We hold that the Defendant was properly transferred to the trial court. We further hold that the Defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but his confession was unlawfully coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause and thus inadmissible at trial. Having found reversible error on that basis, we vacate the Defendant’s convictions of second-degree murder and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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