TONI MITCHELL, Administratrix of the Estate of D’Juantez Mitchell; COURTNEY JEWELL-MOORE, Guardian, Mother, and Next Friend of KMM, KCM, JLM, and JAM, minors v. STEVE CONRAD, BRYAN ARNOLD, individually and in his official capacity as a Law Enforcement Officer for the Louisville Metro Police Department - Articles

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TONI MITCHELL, Administratrix of the Estate of D’Juantez Mitchell; COURTNEY JEWELL-MOORE, Guardian, Mother, and Next Friend of KMM, KCM, JLM, and JAM, minors v. STEVE CONRAD, BRYAN ARNOLD, individually and in his official capacity as a Law Enforcement Officer for the Louisville Metro Police Department

Posted by: Azya Thornton on May 14, 2026

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Kristie B. Walker, JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Hal D. Friedman, COOPER & FRIEDMAN, PLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Kristie B. Walker, Richard Elder, Andrew S. Miller, JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Hal D. Friedman, COOPER & FRIEDMAN, PLC, Louisville, Kentucky, Gregory Simms, SIMMS LAW OFFICE, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees.

Judge(s): SUTTON, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Defendant Bryan Arnold, a law enforcement officer, initiated a traffic stop of D’Juantez Mitchell, who was suspected of committing several armed robberies. During the stop, Mitchell drove his car into Arnold and towards a fellow officer. In response, Arnold shot and killed Mitchell. Mitchell’s estate and children dispute that Arnold was justified in using deadly force and sued, alleging that Arnold had violated Mitchell’s rights under both the United States Constitution and Kentucky law. The district court found that Arnold was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law but not entitled to immunity under Kentucky law after concluding that the record created a genuine dispute whether Arnold acted in good faith. Because the evidence presents no triable issue regarding a bad faith motive on Arnold’s part, we reverse.

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