MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Class-action suits brought against automobile insurers in many courts from around the country have asked the same question. Suppose an insurer promises to pay the “actual cash value” of an insured’s vehicle if the vehicle gets destroyed in an accident. Suppose further that the insurer uses the same formula to calculate actual cash value. If car owners believe that this general formula includes an improper reduction, may they pursue a class action? Five circuit courts have now said “no” because individual issues about the unique value of each used car will dominate all other matters. See Ambrosio v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 154 F.4th 1107, 1110–13 (9th Cir. 2025); Freeman v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 149 F.4th 461, 468–71 (4th Cir. 2025); Schroeder v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 146 F.4th 567, 576–78 (7th Cir. 2025); Drummond v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 142 F.4th 149, 158–61 (3d Cir. 2025); Sampson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 83 F.4th 414, 417, 421–23 (5th Cir. 2023). This case asks the same question. When calculating the “actual cash value” of destroyed vehicles, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company often relies on the advertised prices of comparable used vehicles. It then imposes a “typical negotiation” adjustment that reduces the estimated value of these comparators to account for negotiations that lower their final sales prices. Jessica Clippinger brought a class-action challenge to this typical-negotiation adjustment, claiming that it generally undervalues the comparator vehicles. Even if Clippinger were correct, though, we agree with the other circuit courts that she cannot pursue this theory on a class-wide basis. To determine whether State Farm paid “actual cash value” for the 90,000 used vehicles in the class, a jury would have to consider unique evidence about each vehicle’s value. And this individual valuation will “predominate” over all other questions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). To be sure, the district court tried to avoid the need for case-by-case evidence by holding that it could estimate every class member’s damages using a simple calculation that would refund the amount of the typical-negotiation adjustment. But this proposed solution would wrongly read Rule 23 to eliminate State Farm’s “substantive right” to present unique evidence that it paid fair market value to a specific class member despite its use of the adjustment. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). We thus reverse the district court’s class-certification order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.