NORTON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. v. VILLAGE OF ST. BERNARD, OHIO; GERALD L. STOKER, Building Commissioner; BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS; VILLAGE OF ST. BERNARD, OHIO - Articles

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NORTON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. v. VILLAGE OF ST. BERNARD, OHIO; GERALD L. STOKER, Building Commissioner; BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS; VILLAGE OF ST. BERNARD, OHIO

Posted by: Azya Thornton on Mar 4, 2026

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Michael A. Galasso, ROBBINS, KELLY, PATTERSON & TUCKER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Ray C. Freudiger, MARSHALL DENNEHEY, P.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Michael A. Galasso, Zachary C. Schaengold, ROBBINS, KELLY, PATTERSON & TUCKER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Ray C. Freudiger, MARSHALL DENNEHEY, P.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees.

Judge(s): BOGGS, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The Village of St. Bernard (“Village”), a small municipality and enclave of Cincinnati, relied on its billboard ordinance to prohibit Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (“Norton”) from erecting a digital billboard. Norton sued, raising various arguments against the Village’s ordinance under the First Amendment. After the district court granted summary judgment to the Village, we reversed, holding that one portion of the Village’s ordinance governing “public service” signs was an invalid content-based restriction on speech. Norton Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard (“Norton I”), 99 F.4th 840, 842 (6th Cir. 2024). In so doing, we remanded the case to the district court to determine in the first instance whether the unconstitutional public-service exemption was severable from the rest of the ordinance. The district court, finding that the provision was severable and that the remainder of the ordinance satisfied intermediate scrutiny, again granted judgment in favor of the Village, and Norton appealed once more. Because the public-service exemption is severable and the ordinance otherwise passes constitutional muster, we affirm.

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