JOHN DOE, on behalf of himself and others so situated v. JOHN BURLEW, in his official capacity as Daviess County, Kentucky Attorney and on behalf of all County Attorneys in their official capacities - Articles

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JOHN DOE, on behalf of himself and others so situated v. JOHN BURLEW, in his official capacity as Daviess County, Kentucky Attorney and on behalf of all County Attorneys in their official capacities

Posted by: Julia Wilburn on Jan 28, 2026

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: John H. Heyburn, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for John Burlew.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Guy Hamilton-Smith, LAW OFFICE OF GUY HAMILTON-SMITH, Washington, D.C., for John Doe.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: John H. Heyburn, Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for John Burlew.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Guy Hamilton-Smith, LAW OFFICE OF GUY HAMILTON-SMITH, Washington, D.C., for John Doe.

Judge(s): GIBBONS, WHITE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro

This case shows the “cost” that litigants impose on themselves when they pursue only facial constitutional claims. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024). Kentucky passed a law requiring covered sex offenders to put their legal names on their qualifying social-media accounts. John Doe (a covered sex offender) sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional and moved for a preliminary injunction. He argued that the law violated the First Amendment because it barred regulated parties from speaking anonymously online. Yet he did not attempt to enjoin the law as applied to any specific speech or any specific social-media account. Rather, he sought broad relief by arguing that the law was facially overbroad. Although the district court agreed with Doe, it did not engage in the demanding comprehensive review that a facial challenge requires. See id. at 723–26. Like the Supreme Court in NetChoice, then, we vacate the court’s injunction and remand for further proceedings.

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