JAMES A. DELANIS v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY - Articles

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JAMES A. DELANIS v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY

Posted by: Azya Thornton on Nov 24, 2025

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Allison L. Bussell, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Robert Mendes.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Robert E. Boston, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. John I. Harris III, SCHULMAN, LEROY & BENNETTT, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Allison L. Bussell, Melissa Roberge, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Robert Mendes

Attorneys 4: Robert E. Boston, Michael A. Cottone, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. John I. Harris III, SCHULMAN, LEROY & BENNETTT, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Judge(s): SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville

SUTTON, Chief Judge. A Nashville city councilman threatened to withdraw business from a law firm, which served as the city’s outside counsel, due to the position one of its attorneys took as the chair of the county election commission on a tax referendum. When the attorney declined the law firm’s request that he oppose the referendum, the firm fired him. The attorney sued the council member and the law firm for retaliating against his federal free-speech rights, namely his support of the tax-repeal referendum in his capacity as the county election chair. The district court denied qualified immunity to each defendant in ruling on their motions to dismiss. The law firm is eligible for qualified immunity in view of the government work it performed. And it did not violate any clearly established law. We know of no case in which the First Amendment prohibited a law firm from firing one of its lawyers when the business interests of the firm, including demands from one of its clients, triggered the firing. We thus reverse that portion of the district court’s decision. On the other hand, the council member’s alleged actions violated clearly established law, and we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

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