The case of Copass v. Hall Moody Institute gives the current Tennessee Supreme Court a target, an aspiration, something to strive for, as to how a good opinion should be written and it presents an interesting legal issue that is still important today.

An action for damages was brought by Frances Copass against Hall Moody Institute, the predecessor of what is now the University of Tennessee at Martin (the author’s alma mater). The cause of action was breach of contract — Copass sued the Institute after the trustees fired her four and a half months into her employment as a teacher. It seems that Copass, a lady of excellent education, had just reached her majority when the trustees of the Institute hired her as a teacher, most notably of zoology, which was her first time engaged in teaching. Although she was the plaintiff in the action, she is listed by Mr. Pickle (the official reporter, if readers are not familiar with the previous system) as the defendant, because back then the appellant was still considered to be the plaintiff on appeal.

As the Tennessee Supreme Court explained, in an opinion authored by Justice John S. Wilkes, the record showed that the plaintiff was "a young lady, handsome in appearance, attractive in bearing, gifted in conversation, and of cheerful and social disposition." But, noted the court, the trustees were of the opinion that she was too much devoted to society and had too much company for the best interests of the school.

Hall Moody Institute was a denominational school — Missionary Baptist. The plaintiff, as well as the other teachers and principal belonged to this denomination, and so did the trustees, who were selected from the businessmen of Martin: some merchants, some bankers, some grocers, and some other occupations including the minister of the Baptist Church, who will play a prominent role as the events of the case unfold.

The court was confronted by what it called the most difficult and delicate question that had ever been presented for its consideration: what is excessive indulgence in social functions and recreations? The court noted that the plaintiff had been supplied with a boarding house by the trustees, generally in their own homes, and while there she was under their watchful care — so watchful, said the court, that the number of her visitors and the dates of their visits were impressed on the memories of the trustees, or else jotted down in memoranda, with the names and number of visitors that plaintiff had, the dates of their calls and the hours they kept.

The complaints against the plaintiff included being indiscreet in visiting a minstrel show, in going to the railroad station at an early hour of the morning to see a lady friend off the train and returning alone to her boarding house, in going to a café and partaking of refreshments, in receiving the attention of young men at a late hour in the evening, and in being guilty of other improprieties of like character.

On one occasion, one of the plaintiff’s pupils (Hoyt White, a young man of some 20 years of age) called on the plaintiff in a social way and she did not inquire of him whether he had permission to do so from the principal, but simply presumed that he had. White testified that he did not have such permission, and the gravamen of the plaintiff’s offense in this regard consisted in not inquiring whether he had a “permit,” or in not sending him home. He also testified that on one occasion, while walking with the complainant, she leaned familiarly on his arm, and at the same time said to some pupils whom they met to “hurry up,” if they desired to catch up with certain young ladies.

Although the trustees talked among themselves as to the plaintiff’s demeanor, they did not at first talk to her. After a time, the board appointed a committee to do so. The committee, which consisted of the pastor and another trustee, approached the plaintiff with a planned mode of operation: the minister was to open the interview. He did so, but the plaintiff defended her action in a forcible manner, that is, “she talked back.” The other committeeman then took over and continued the lecture. He told her that whereas the minister had reasoned with her to no avail, he would talk plain, and stated his ultimatum that she must quit having company from Monday morning until Friday night and that she must not sit up at night after 10:30 as that was the retiring hour at her boarding house. After laying down this ultimatum, the lay member of the committee testified that he and the minister sat there for quite a while and “looked at each other.” And while the board had directed the two committeemen to tell the plaintiff that she would be discharged if she did not comply with their demands, the plaintiff "so very cordially and politely thanked them, and agreed to comply with their demands, and talked so pleasantly," that the committeemen were so "thoroughly beguiled with her manners and ways that they did not deliver the ultimatum."

As it happened, on the next Saturday after the remonstration, Barlow’s Minstrels struck the town, and the plaintiff, having received a free ticket and an invitation from a gentleman to attend, went to the non-clergy committeeman and asked if there would be any impropriety in her attending and if she could go. The committeeman told her she could go, and he added that if ever there was a good minstrel show, it would be Barlow’s and that if he was well enough, he would go and take his wife.

On the Sunday after the minstrel show, the committeeman called on plaintiff at her boarding house (apparently without the minister) and talked to her about keeping better order in the chapel, a matter which, for want of time, physical capacity or some other cause, had been neglected at the first interview. He said that he was pleased with this second interview and left thinking he had the plaintiff “going his way.” But the committeeman further testified that the plaintiff had failed to lecture the pupils on Monday, as she had promised to do, and that he had learned that she had company on Sunday night until about midnight. The same committee was appointed to visit her again, this time to for sure give her the ultimatum that she would be discharged if she did not comply. The committeeman testified that they followed the same plan of attack as on the first occasion: the minister talked first, until he exhausted himself, and the other committeeman then took it up, and told the plaintiff in plain terms what the board demanded. But it did not go as the committee had hoped: the plaintiff protested that she had done nothing wrong, and the committee retired. The plaintiff was then summoned before the board of trustees and was discharged, which led to the lawsuit.

The Tennessee Supreme Court first took up the question of the plaintiff’s deportment, commenting on the evidence that on one or two occasions, when she had been to an entertainment, she had sat up and had company until nearly midnight. As to this point, the court brought its own habits into consideration:

The members of this court have been known to sit up until 12 o'clock at night. It is true, they have the company of very entertaining records, and in the consideration of contingent remainders, executory devises and the class doctrine, the time passes by without any note, so that we cannot . . . say that an occasional staying up until 12 o'clock with pleasant company is excessive. We are not aware that we have been rendered less efficient by such hours. Indeed, this seems to be the settled policy of the state, and we have heard of no criticism on this account; and there seems now to be a disposition to allow such members of the court as desire to do so to continue the practice.

The court next took up the plaintiff’s job performance. The chief complaint was that she could not maintain order in the study hall, where she had been put in charge of some 65 pupils of both sexes, many of them being young men and young ladies of her own age. While she was engaged in hearing a class recite and in demonstrating on the blackboard, the unruly boys would take advantage of her occupation, and do things which would create a disturbance in the room. On two occasions marbles were rolled across the floor, evidently coming from the boys’ side. The girls were dismissed, and the boys were lined up and put on honor at which time it was revealed that none of them did it. The court noted that “the marbles evidently got loose and rolled themselves while the teacher’s back was turned.”

The court noted that it would be "beyond the reach of human possibilities to expect a young lady to preserve entire good order in such an assemblage of young people, full of life and fun, and often wanton mischief," continuing as follows:

Even in this court, composed of mature, not to say old, men, devoted to the enforcement of law and order, with a chief justice ever on the alert, and a marshal ready and watchful to check any disorder, and with very rare occasion for any fun and pleasantry, occasionally a slight ripple of disturbance will arise; and that notwithstanding that the court is armed with a process of contempt to preserve and enforce order. We are judicially informed that some disorder occasionally occurs in the trial courts, notwithstanding the efforts of the trial judge and sheriff. It is requiring too much to hold the plaintiff as an insurer against any and all disturbances in a school room. The trial judge properly charged that she would be responsible for inattention and neglect only, and could not be held to keep order at all hazards. This would be requiring more diligence and a higher degree of control than is required of common carriers in the shipment of mules and other livestock, where the carrier is excused from such injury as results from the native unruly disposition of the stock, and we cannot require of this young lady, in the management of boys and girls congregated in a schoolroom, a higher degree of control than is applied to shippers of livestock crowded into cars and subjected to many inconveniences.

And that brings us to the zoology class. The principal directed the class to go out into the open fields with the plaintiff in charge. The principal reported that, after they had gone, he followed and found the plaintiff and pupils paired off by couples, eating watermelons. The plaintiff's version of this is that the plan of operation was to take a mosquito bar (like a net), and, holding it by the corners, use it as a dragnet to catch all the bugs, worms, butterflies, grasshoppers, frogs and other objects they could, and take them to the Institute for dissection and study at leisure — a practice similar to medical students in search of subjects for dissection. It seems that some of the boys, in carrying the dragnet through the field of Mr. Farmer, one of the trustees, caught some watermelons. They gallantly shared them with the girls, and while the melons were being dissected on the ground (being too heavy to carry to the Institute) the principal appeared. The only criticism the principal made at the time was that perhaps it would be best to divide the class thereafter. The court observed that the jury thought, undoubtedly, that no great injury had been done in this matter.

All of these matters were placed before the jury and commented on with great eloquence by counsel; the jury, after a deliberation of five minutes, returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that most of the disorder in the school had been caused by the sons of the trustees, who were also the principal witnesses against the plaintiff as to these disorders. One of them, notably (White), was a witness as to his own improper visits socially to the plaintiff, when she supposed he had a permit to come. The court noted that no imputation was cast upon the character of the young men who paid attentions to the plaintiff. It was agreed that they were "the cream of Martin society, intelligent and refined," including one "polished by years of foreign travel" and one "a prominent member of the bar and a practitioner before the Supreme Court." Among those who had paid attention was an insurance agent, and although the plaintiff had never been introduced to him, she nevertheless talked to him and walked with him. The plaintiff explained her relation to him, no doubt satisfactorily to the jury, said the court, “as it is to this court.” Besides, added the court, the well-known modesty and retiring disposition of insurance agents is prima facie evidence that he was a gentleman, as the proof demonstrates he was.

The plaintiff prevailed before the jury and the verdict was approved by the trial judge. But the Institute argued that a new trial should have been granted because of undue pressure and influence brought to bear on the jury by the public at the trial. The motion for new trial was supported by the affidavits of six trustees, who were also witnesses in the case. Their affidavits state, in substance, that

The case attracted a great deal of attention and interest in Weakley County, and that the courtroom was crowded with partisan adherents of the plaintiff; that they filled up the space allotted for the spectators, and also the bar, and crowded around the jury; that they manifested their approval of plaintiff's case by applauding her attorneys with hand–clapping, and other means, in the presence of the jury; that they shook their heads, and smiled and frowned, and by other facial expressions manifested their approval or disapproval as the case progressed; that on the close of the speeches of counsel for plaintiff there was a vigorous applause, by hand–clapping and otherwise, and that this tended to influence the jury; that inflammatory utterances were made by her counsel; that the case was talked about in the presence and hearing of the jury by the friends of the plaintiff, both ladies and men, and the hope and belief were expressed that the plaintiff would win her case; that the shops and stores, the offices and public places, streets and business houses, the court house and hotels, were filled with her friends, male and female, talking and commenting about the case; that the jury, in consequence, did not take time to consider the verdict, or read the charge, or weigh the evidence, but returned with a verdict for plaintiff within five minutes after retiring; that its delivery was loudly cheered, and she and her attorneys were openly and profusely congratulated on the result, that the public sentiment was molded in plaintiff's favor by public comment on the streets and in the press, so that a fair and impartial trial was not had. The sworn statements of the clerk of the court and of the jury were introduced, to the effect that while there was a large crowd present, and much interest manifested, no remarks were made by spectators in the presence of the jury. There was applause for both parties in the court room and in the presence of the jury, which the court on each occasion suppressed, and on each occasion rebuked the audience.

The jury stated that they were in no wise and to no extent influenced by these manifestations. Some of them stated that

They knew public feeling was high, but could not tell whether it preponderated in favor of one side or the other; that they were not approached or talked to by the friends of either; that the trustees, some of the witnesses, and many of the friends of the institution appeared in court with the badge of the institution displayed on their bosoms or collars; that they based their decision on the law and the facts; that they were not influenced by public sentiment or manifestations; and that they disapproved of the applause, and considered it out of place. Counsel for plaintiff stated that the first applause occurred at a sharp answer to plaintiff's attorney; that there was no applause during speeches, but some laughter; that there was never any applause but hand-clapping, and no cheering at any time, and that the applause was promptly checked and rebuked whenever it occurred; and that no exception was taken to any of it at any time by defendant's counsel.

The Tennessee Supreme Court observed as to these contentions, that it was satisfied that the efforts of counsel on both sides merited, if the propriety of the case would permit, a great deal more applause than had in fact been given. The court further noted that faint echoes of counsel’s eloquence had even reached the court, and on this feature of the case the parties were well balanced. The court approved the verdict and the judgment below was affirmed.

To demonstrate the inevitable progress of liberalism, and to put the case in historical perspective, 40 years after the events of this case, in 1943, the author's mother would be written up for wearing pants on campus at the very same institution, by that time known as the University of Tennessee Junior College. Her offense was unavoidable, she explained, because she was returning from her aviation class at the airport.